COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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U.S. DNI, RADM Anderson, as the Navy’s lead representative for the technicalexchanges. 228 Demonstrating the distrust and technical chauvinism characteristicof many in the U.S. Navy at this time, the Navy’s internal assessment wasthat Tizard’s Mission was most likely a ploy on the part of the British to gainaccess to U.S. industry and Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen, the Director of theNavy Research Lab (NRL), believed the Navy would get little from theexchange, given American technological superiority. 229 The Navy’s assessmentwould be proved wrong.Tizard left the UK on 14 August 1940 and, while his team was heavily slantedtoward experts in radar, his group was given permission to provide the Americanswith information on 21 different technologies, to include anti-aircraft guns, armorplating, self-sealing fuel tanks, and gyroscopic gunsights—all of which had beentested in the field of battle. Tizard’s mission was classified as Top Secret, sinceany word of the exchange would likely inflame U.S. isolationists. 230The Tizard Mission began on 29 August 1940. The first meetings concernedasdic, sonar, and anti-submarine warfare. While reticent at first, by the afternoonof the first day the U.S. team had warmed to their British visitors andwere quite excited about exploring the possibility of combining the two countries’research efforts on sonar and asdic, as both sides had taken different, butcomplementary, approaches to the submarine detection problem. That sameday, the British also described advances they had made in radar, which completelyimpressed the Americans. 231 However, U.S. distrust of the British was228 Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Lothian),” 29July 1940, FRUS 1940 vol. 3, 79; Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 57; Zimmerman, 76-77.Amazingly, as David Zimmerman relates in his comprehensive study of the Tizard Mission, TopSecret Exchange, Churchill almost scuttled the Tizard Mission before the U.S. was able to officiallyaccept it. Demonstrating all of the British attitudes that inhibited cooperation between the two countriesin the period before the U.S. entered the war, Churchill on 17 July 1940 wrote to his Chiefs ofStaff liaison, GEN Ismay, querying why his advisors were so quick to toss away Britain’s precioussecrets to the U.S. when the U.S. was so loath to give anything back. He also noted the superiorityof British technology to anything America possessed and demonstrated substantial resentment thatthe U.S. was still far away from entering the war. Churchill also expressed grave reservations overU.S. security, commenting that anything they gave the Americans would soon find its way to Germany.Churchill’s correspondence to Ismay stands in marked contrast to his more famous letters toRoosevelt, in which he displays, for obvious reasons, none of the distrust and resentment of Americathat is evident from this incident. Progress on Roosevelt’s destroyers-for-bases deal allowedChurchill to overcome his pique and give final approval to the mission. For additional informationsee Zimmerman, 82.229Zimmerman, 46-47.230 Zimmerman, 94-95, 98231 Zimmerman, 102-105.65
still a powerful influence. While Zimmerman has written that the Navyremoved many of their restrictions concerning the sharing of U.S. technologyby 4 September 1940, a 16 September 1940 memorandum from DNI Andersonto the head of the U.S. National Defense Research Council (NDRC), Dr. VannevarBush, made it clear that the NDRC was not to discuss any Navy technologieswith the British without Navy Department personnel present, that theNDRC must not discuss anything on the Navy’s list of topics prohibited for discussion,and that there must be nothing discussed about capabilities in development.232 Bush replied two days later, stating the NDRC would respect theNavy’s policy but was hopeful it would change “since all of the work of theCommittee has to do with development, and since “I [Bush] believe that thediscussions on such matters are likely to be of particular benefit.” 233By the end of September, the rest of Tizard’s team had arrived in the U.S. andsometime around 27 September, Tizard presented his American hosts with a “resonantcavity magnetron,” the key component for constructing a microwave radar, apiece of technology the U.S. was still months, if not years, away from developingindependently. 234 Both Zimmerman and Leutze contend that this magnanimous giftand the free and open exchange of other information the British provided during themonth proceeding its delivery, completely changed the attitude of the Navy and WarDepartments with regard to sharing of technical information. 235 The archival dataconfirm this assessment. On 28 September 1940, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knoxissued a letter concerning the Tizard Mission to all the bureaus of the Navy staff. Inthat letter, he cancelled all restrictions on the provision of technical information toGreat Britain with the exception of the Norden bombsight and the antenna mine,which were to remain secret. Knox’s reasoning, much like Kirk’s, was that the Britishshould be given “drawings, specifications, performance data and any otherdetailed information” concerning U.S. technologies because “advantages...willaccrue to [the United States] in the matter of procurement and combat tests.” 236 ByOctober, even the pessimistic RADM Bowen was won over by the liberality of the232Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to Dr. VannevarBush, 16 September 1940, DNI Correspondence; Zimmerman, 106. The NDRC was formed byRoosevelt earlier in 1940. A civilian organization formed at Roosevelt’s direction, its charter wassimilar to today’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Although the NDRCwas not supposed to duplicate research being done by the military service labs, there was distrustbetween the labs and the NDRC, as indicated by Anderson’s concerns that members of the NDRCwere meeting independently with members of the Tizard mission.233 Dr. Vannevar Bush, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of NavalIntelligence, 18 September 1940, DNI Correspondence.234 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 58.235 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 5859; Zimmerman, 124-129.236 Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, Letter to All Navy Bureaus and Directors, 28 September1940, DNI Correspondence, 1-2.66
Page 1 and 2:
COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
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officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
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ships in violation of treaty limits
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assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
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might bear on their work.” 39 As
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ility over time, its operational in
Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
Page 28 and 29: told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
Page 30 and 31: ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
Page 32 and 33: firmly believed that British polici
Page 34: ecame one of the primary sources of
Page 37 and 38: of shoring up their strategic weakn
Page 39 and 40: mon framework for negotiation with
Page 43 and 44: assuaged British concerns about the
Page 45 and 46: In the area of intelligence exchang
Page 47 and 48: clear to the Americans that if they
Page 49 and 50: in his mind worked against closer c
Page 51 and 52: praised the fighting spirit of the
Page 53 and 54: through November of 1940 persuaded
Page 55 and 56: and Great Britain. His principalcon
Page 57 and 58: eceived by the British and from the
Page 59 and 60: gear designed by the British. Altho
Page 61 and 62: American Attitudes On Intelligence
Page 63 and 64: information did have an impact on K
Page 65 and 66: the affair. 183 This lack of resent
Page 67 and 68: tion exchanges. Even more significa
Page 69 and 70: nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
Page 71 and 72: good will and encouraged greater co
Page 73 and 74: would merely show Donovan “the be
Page 75: Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
Page 79 and 80: Since the Tizard Mission had only a
Page 81 and 82: appropriating large increases to th
Page 83 and 84: the French, a point which would not
Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
Page 87 and 88: when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
Page 93 and 94: high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
Page 95 and 96: to successfully interpret the instr
Page 97 and 98: to little more than a nebulous stat
Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
Page 101 and 102: Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
Page 103 and 104: Godfrey’s main concern was most l
Page 105 and 106: possesses complementary capabilitie
Page 107 and 108: 2. Be prepared to give something of
Page 109 and 110: had in forming its own Joint Intell
Page 112 and 113: GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
Page 116: APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
Page 119 and 120: ________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121 and 122: ________. “The Secret of the Chur
Page 123 and 124: Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
Page 128 and 129:
IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
Page 130 and 131:
Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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