COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

had in forming its own Joint Intelligence Committee. Despite their greater traditionof interdepartmental intelligence coordination and the pressures of actualconflict, they still had problems making the JIC function effectively even a yearinto the war. Either naiveté or hubris on their part had led them to expect theAmerican intelligence system to adopt a similar system on their recommendation.Had the British been more sensitive to U.S. perceptions of them and the Americanconcerns about the relationship, they would have realized that recommendationson how to organize the U.S. war effort were bound to generate significantresentment. Waiting until the relationship was more mature and on surer footingwould have been more appropriate and effective, given the level of U.S. concernover British attempts to dominate their partnership.Remaining QuestionsAlthough numerous studies address this period, as documented in the bibliographyattached to this work, some questions remain to be explored.1. Why did BGEN Strong make the offer to share SIGINT information withthe British during the Standardization of Arms Talks? At what level was this decisionauthorized? Why was the Navy not informed of the offer before it wasmade?2. How influential were Kirk’s attaché reports? While it is obvious that theDNI, RADM Anderson, and the CNO, ADM Stark, read Kirk’s reports, there areindications that the Secretary of the Navy and the President read them as well.Although we do know that Kirk’s reputation was overwhelmingly positive, howmuch credibility was given to his attaché reporting concerning Great Britain’schances for survival after the fall of France?3. What was the exact nature of the relationship between William Stephenson’sBSC and the U.S. Navy? Did ONI realize that information it was receiving fromthe FBI originated with the BSC? When did ONI begin cooperating with the BSCand what were their impressions of the organization? Other than Stephenson’sconnections with Donovan and Knox and the cooperation between ONI and theBSC in counterintelligence efforts, did the BSC attempt to influence NavyDepartment policies through any other overt or covert mechanisms?4. What was the full extent of information exchanged through the Joint BaileyCommittee mechanism? Which side benefited more from the exchange of informationthrough that mechanism—the British or the Americans?98