COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
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officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
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ships in violation of treaty limits
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assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
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might bear on their work.” 39 As
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ility over time, its operational in
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Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
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told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
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ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
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firmly believed that British polici
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ecame one of the primary sources of
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of shoring up their strategic weakn
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mon framework for negotiation with
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assuaged British concerns about the
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In the area of intelligence exchang
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clear to the Americans that if they
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in his mind worked against closer c
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praised the fighting spirit of the
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through November of 1940 persuaded
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and Great Britain. His principalcon
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eceived by the British and from the
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gear designed by the British. Altho
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American Attitudes On Intelligence
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information did have an impact on K
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the affair. 183 This lack of resent
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tion exchanges. Even more significa
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nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
Page 71 and 72: good will and encouraged greater co
Page 73 and 74: would merely show Donovan “the be
Page 75 and 76: Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
Page 77 and 78: still a powerful influence. While Z
Page 79 and 80: Since the Tizard Mission had only a
Page 81 and 82: appropriating large increases to th
Page 83 and 84: the French, a point which would not
Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
Page 87 and 88: when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
Page 93 and 94: high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
Page 95 and 96: to successfully interpret the instr
Page 97 and 98: to little more than a nebulous stat
Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
Page 101 and 102: Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
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Page 105 and 106: possesses complementary capabilitie
Page 107 and 108: 2. Be prepared to give something of
Page 109 and 110: had in forming its own Joint Intell
Page 112 and 113: GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
Page 116: APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
Page 119 and 120: ________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121: ________. “The Secret of the Chur
Page 126 and 127: INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
Page 128 and 129: IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
Page 130 and 131: Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
Page 132: PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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