COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

the affair. 183 This lack of resentment likely had more to do with Kirk’s anti-Nazi feelings than his pro-British tendencies. Like most officers of his generation,Kirk remained wary of the British, as evidenced when he forwarded adetailed intelligence report on Mexico to Anderson that Godfrey had providedhim in November 1939. Kirk asked Anderson to have ONI’s analysts take ahard look at it and to let him know if the information in it could be confirmed.As he told Anderson, “[i]t would help me to know whether or not I am beingmade a ‘stooge.’” 184 Kirk’s concerns demonstrate that, although he was receptiveto Godfrey’s overtures, he was not blindly trustful of what the DNI providedhim.The two most significant items of information the British gave Kirk duringthis period, items given without any reciprocal exchange from the U.S., asGodfrey pointed out, were intelligence on the German magnetic mine and theopportunity to examine vessels damaged in enemy action. The decision togive the Americans the information on the mine was very significant, givenBritish security concerns, but the Admiralty reasoned that one day the AmericanNavy would join their fight, and if the U.S. fleet was vulnerable to thistype of mine it would be an ineffective force until such time as they couldinstall the proper countermeasures. 185 In early November 1939, Kirk wasinvited to the Admiralty to speak to the Director of the Minesweeping Division,CAPT Morse, who told Kirk the information he was going to give himneeded to “be treated with the utmost secrecy” as the British government wasvery concerned the Germans would find out just how effective the mine hadbeen. 186 While the British had not recovered a mine intact at this point, theyshared every bit of data they had with Kirk, to include their theories on theactuation method, size of the explosive payload, the method of delivery, themost effective deployment depth of the mine, its destructive effect, and howthe British were attempting to counter it using an experimental degaussingmethod. 187 Kirk was also given information about the German 21-inch torpedo,the British asdic system (sonar), and he was notified by the British183 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 20 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1.184Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 9 November 1939, Kirk Papers.185 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 56.186 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, Enclosure (B) to letter dated 6 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. Cited hereafteras Kirk, Enclosure (B) to Letter to Anderson, 6 November 1939.187 Kirk, Enclosure (B) to Letter to Anderson, 6 November 1939, 1-4.54