COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

appropriating large increases to the defense budget. 249 This was not enough, however.The Army and Navy, in their 1 July 1940 assessment “Are We Ready-II,”determined that the “the emergency now faced is one of worldwide dimensionswhich menaces every foreign policy of the United States” and concluded that,despite the influx of additional funds, the military was unprepared for war. 250Given this fact, Roosevelt and his advisors determined that it was best to establishthe groundwork for cooperation prior to the U.S. entry into the war, as attemptingto do so would alleviate many of the problems the U.S. experienced in World WarI when trying to integrate their forces with the allied powers. 251 This position wasreinforced by the attaché reports they were receiving from Kirk, who articulatelyrelayed his assessment that Dutch and Belgian refusals to hold staff talks with theBritish and French prior to the German invasion of those countries was a majorfactor in their defeat and the eventual rout of the allied powers in France. 252The fall of France also changed the direction of U.S. strategic thinking, shiftingthe focus from the Far East to the European theater. Although it is unknownhow much impact his report may have had, Kirk wrote a persuasive assessment ofthe strategic situation in late June 1940 that recommended an Atlantic-first strategymonths before Stark’s Plan Dog memo outlined the new U.S. strategic policy.Kirk noted that the British firmly believed the U.S. would enter on their side atsome stage and they were committed to holding the islands as a base from whichthe U.S. could project offensive power. Looking at the global situation, Kirkassessed the British Isles as the true center of gravity for the allies in the war, reasoningthat everything on the periphery of the British Empire could be sacrificedbut if the Home Islands were lost, it was unlikely the Axis would be defeated. 253Kirk was certainly not alone in seeing how the fall of France had altered the strategiclandscape for the U.S., but his opinion did reach high-level policymakers inthe U.S. government, who respected his judgment. Though they had rejected hisadvice previously due to domestic political constraints, after the fall of FranceU.S. policymakers felt they had far more latitude to explore a cooperative partnershipwith Britain than they had available to them at the start of the war.249 Reynolds, 109..250Chairman, General Board, “Are We Ready—II,” 1 July 1940, Strategic Planning.251 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 39.252 lan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 14 May 1940, Kirk Papers; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to RearAdmiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 1 June 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-2. Inthis same report, Kirk also noted the improvement in intelligence cooperation with the British, statinghow the embassy was being routinely provided the daily intelligence summary given to the BritishWar Cabinet by June 1940.253 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 24 June 1940, Kirk Papers, 1.70