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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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ility over time, its operational intelligence components were subordinate tothe Fleet Commanders and the operations and planning sides of the NavyStaff. 50In addition to the NID and the JIC, there were three other British interdepartmentalactivities that would attempt to engage the U.S. Navy in closerintelligence ties during the interwar period. These were the GC&CS, the FarEast Combined Bureau, and the SIS. Under the control of the Foreign Officeand Sir Stewart Menzies, the day-to-day operations of the GC&CS were runby Commander Alistair Denniston. A truly interdepartmental effort, the Britishhad consolidated all of their cryptographic resources into this organizationfollowing the Great War. In addition to analysis of “Y” signals (HF/DF andlow-level ciphers), the GC&CS was responsible for breaking high-level militaryand diplomatic codes as well as designing the codes used by the British.In many respects, its responsibilities were similar to those of the present-dayU.S. <strong>National</strong> Security Agency (NSA). 51 In addition to the interdepartmentalorganizations run in London, the British also established overseas intelligencecenters in the Middle and Far East to foster coordination and cooperationbetween the intelligence organizations in those locales. The mostsignificant of these to the U.S. Navy was the Far East Combined Bureau(FECB). Created in Hong Kong in 1935, the FECB moved to Singapore in1939. While principally a SIGINT organization, predominantly manned bythe Royal Navy, the FECB was technically responsible for coordinating allBritish Far East intelligence efforts and became the primary liaison to thecryptographers at U.S. Navy Station CAST in Corregidor, as cooperationbetween the two navies’ intelligence organizations grew. 52 Finally, as will bedetailed in chapter 6, the SIS was also interested in forging a closer relationshipwith ONI, principally in the area of counterintelligence. As documentedin British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British <strong>Intelligence</strong> inthe Americas, 1940-1945, the British SIS branch in New York City under SirWilliam Stephenson spearheaded an effort to actively engage U.S. intelligenceagencies in closer cooperation with their British counterparts as part of50 For more information on the development, structure, and operation of the OIC see PatrickBeesly’s excellent history of the OIC, Very Special <strong>Intelligence</strong>, xv, 1-2, 11-18, 19-23, 26-34, and42-43; see also Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 12-13.51 For additional information on the development, structure, and operations of the GC&CS see:Stripp, 13-14, 150; Bath 10; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 26-29; MacLachlan, 32.52 Aldrich, 20, 36; Bath, 139-140.13

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