COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

etween the two countries, exchanges that were orchestrated by the British to tiethe two countries closer together, even though the threat of war was still manymonths away for the United States. 221Special Missions—1940Numerous individuals in England shared Godfrey’s view that the best way togain the cooperation of the Americans was to make them indebted to the Britishby providing them information gratis. Two of the most influential individualswere Archibald Vivian (A.V.) Hill and Henry Tizard, two of Great Britain’s topscientists. Hill had been sent to America on a secret mission in March 1940 toassess U.S. scientific and technological prowess and production capabilities.By April, Hill was convinced that most Americans were pro-British, despite theprevalence of isolationist sentiments, and that the Americans were not nearly sotechnologically backward as the British had always assumed. 222 Hill believed itin the best interests of Britain to share technical secrets with America, not justto secure American good will, but also to tap into and guide the tremendousproductive capacity of the U.S. to meet England’s wartime needs. To implementthese ideas, Hill called upon the British Ambassador to the U.S., Lord Lothian,recommending that he contact the Foreign Office to suggest a technicalexchange mission to America, with the principal goal of providing the U.S.with British radar technology. 223221 Donovan would undertake a second fact-finding mission for the President from December1940 to March 1941. In addition to visiting England, Donovan traveled extensively through theMediterranean and the Balkans, assessing the situation in those areas. He became increasingly closeto some of the main figures in British intelligence, particularly DNI Godfrey, who advised the commanderof British forces in the Mediterranean to show Donovan whatever he wanted to see since,given Donovan’s access and pro-British sympathies, Godfrey felt the British could “achieve infinitelymore through Donovan than through any other individual.” See Ford, 99. Donovan’s experiencewith British intelligence would also persuade him that the U.S. also needed a centralintelligence organization, an idea he began to advocate with increasing success upon his return toAmerica in March 1941. Donovan was designated Coordinator for Information in July 1941 andhead of the OSS in June 1942. For additional information see Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs:Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operation,1940-45(New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999), 1; Aldrich, 98-99; Ford, 107-108; OSS WarReport, 6-7; BSC, Secret History, 13-15.222 Zimmerman, 50, 54.223 Zimmerman, 53-56. Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) was a supporter of a U.S.-UK alliance and hehad many influential friends among the American elite, especially Roosevelt’s close friend, FelixFrankfurter. For additional information see Zimmerman, 53-54.63