COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive today, the close alliance between the United Statesand Great Britain seems to be a “natural” thing, perhaps the inevitable expressionof what Winston Churchill referred to as the “special relationship” occasioned by“underlying cultural unity.” There are now few among us whose memories goback to the period between the two world wars and who would be able to pointout that, commonalities of language and culture notwithstanding, today's specialrelationship between the United States and Great Britain is a quite recent phenomenon,really dating only from the 1940-41 timeframe.For much of the two and a quarter centuries of our independence, relationshipswith Great Britain have been cool or even strained. Cooperation and intelligencesharing with the British in World War I was late in coming and limited inscope. At the end of the war, it slowed to an almost imperceptible trickle, and wasvery slow to resume. The author outlines the factors accounting for the reluctanceof both sides to share information and the underlying feeling of competitivenessbetween the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy during the interwar years. This hadmoderated by the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, but within a year two differentdynamics had arisen: the American concern after the fall of France that the Britishmight be quickly defeated, and thus US technical and intelligence informationcompromised; and the British single-minded focus on bringing America into thewar and gaining access to our vast technological and industrial resources. To furthertheir goals, the British were willing to provide the United States with virtuallyunlimited access to British secrets — technological as well as intelligence —even without any quid pro quo. Their strategy worked. The author outlines howthe exchange of information started as a trickle, turned into a flood, and enduresto this day.Most books dealing with U.S.-British cooperation during World War II naturallyfocus on the war in Europe and highlight the great British cryptologic successwith the German Enigma codes (actually a Polish-French-British success).Many leave the reader with the impression that the United States, in gainingaccess to Enigma decrypts and Royal Navy operational intelligence techniques,got the better half of the bargain. But this is far from a complete picture. It wasthe Americans who broke the Japanese diplomatic codes and gave codes andmachines to the British, and the Americans who provided the bulk of the effortand success against JN-25, the Japanese navy operational code, although British,Dutch, and Australian cryptanalysts contributed significantly during the war.American scientists and laboratory-industry efforts significantly upgraded thetechnology used to break Enigma codes. Also, OPINTEL, as it exists in the U.S.vii
Navy today, owes as much to the efforts of the Pacific Fleet Combat IntelligenceUnit (also known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific or Station HYPO) as it does to theBritish Operational Intelligence Centre.A number of books have been written about this wartime intelligence cooperation,but this work is the first that provides significant detail on the rocky roadtoward cooperation that both navies traversed through the 1920s and 1930s. Theauthor has tapped a number of original sources and archives which had not previouslybeen plumbed to provide a new perspective on recent, but largely unappreciatednaval history. The reader may find himself reflecting that relationshipswhich appear so "natural" today, were not always that way, and recalling thewords of Chaim Herzog, who as President of Israel, declared that nations don'thave permanent friends or enemies, only "permanent interests."Thomas A. BrooksRear Admiral, United States Navy (ret.)Former Director of Naval Intelligenceviii
Page 1 and 2: COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
Page 4: The Joint Military Intelligence Col
Page 10 and 11: PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
Page 14 and 15: action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
Page 16 and 17: officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
Page 18 and 19: ships in violation of treaty limits
Page 20 and 21: assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
Page 22 and 23: might bear on their work.” 39 As
Page 24 and 25: ility over time, its operational in
Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
Page 28 and 29: told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
Page 30 and 31: ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
Page 32 and 33: firmly believed that British polici
Page 34: ecame one of the primary sources of
Page 37 and 38: of shoring up their strategic weakn
Page 39 and 40: mon framework for negotiation with
Page 43 and 44: assuaged British concerns about the
Page 45 and 46: In the area of intelligence exchang
Page 47 and 48: clear to the Americans that if they
Page 49 and 50: in his mind worked against closer c
Page 51 and 52: praised the fighting spirit of the
Page 53 and 54: through November of 1940 persuaded
Page 55 and 56: and Great Britain. His principalcon
Page 57 and 58:
eceived by the British and from the
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gear designed by the British. Altho
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American Attitudes On Intelligence
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information did have an impact on K
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the affair. 183 This lack of resent
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tion exchanges. Even more significa
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nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
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good will and encouraged greater co
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would merely show Donovan “the be
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Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
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still a powerful influence. While Z
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Since the Tizard Mission had only a
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appropriating large increases to th
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the French, a point which would not
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equested that RADM Ghormley remain
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when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
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it was not official U.S. policy. St
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efforts that had begun with the Sta
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high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
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to successfully interpret the instr
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to little more than a nebulous stat
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to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
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Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
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Godfrey’s main concern was most l
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possesses complementary capabilitie
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2. Be prepared to give something of
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had in forming its own Joint Intell
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GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
Page 119 and 120:
________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121 and 122:
________. “The Secret of the Chur
Page 123 and 124:
Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
Page 126 and 127:
INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
Page 130 and 131:
Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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