COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

The U.S. delegation to the Standardization of Arms talks left the U.S. on12~July 1940 and arrived in England on 15 August. The senior naval representativewas Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, a former Director of War Plans. Thedelegation was given its orders by the President, who designated Ghormley as thenaval attaché, although this designation was changed to Special Naval Observer(SPECNO) just before his arrival, to highlight the distinction between his roleand that of Kirk. 254 Ghormley was accompanied by Brigadier General G. V.Strong, from the U.S. Army, and Major General C. Emmons, from the U.S. ArmyAir Corps. In their first meeting with the British, held on 20 August 1940,Ghormley made it clear that these were not considered formal talks by the U.S.government and that he and the two generals were there as representatives fromtheir individual Services, not as part of a Joint delegation. The British respondedthat they understood this and told the U.S. delegation that, from 21 to 28 August,they would be taken to the headquarters of the three services to see various operationalunits. The Americans were encouraged to ask questions and were told torequest additions to the agenda if there were organizations or capabilities theywould like to see that were not included on the proposed schedule. 255 As with theDonovan visit, which had concluded earlier in the month, and the Tizard Mission,which would begin in the U.S. just days later, the British policy was to hold littleback from the Americans, hopeful that their openness would produce the cooperationthey sought.On 23 August, Ghormley forwarded a report to the CNO from the British concerningthe conduct of the war to that point. Ghormley did not comment on thereport, but it was exceptionally honest about British objectives throughout thefirst year of the war and the miscalculations that had led to defeat. In this brief,the British reiterated the point that Kirk had made: that the failure to successfullyconclude staff talks with the Dutch and the Belgians before the Germans attackedwas a key element in their defeat on the Continent. The British also made sure theU.S. knew that they had subordinated the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) to254 Albion, 550; COMNAVEU Administrative History, 1-2. Roosevelt appears to have believedthat Ghormley, as the senior naval officer in England, would need to have the status of the navalattaché position. Although Kirk made no official comment about how this action would cause himto lose face with the British, he mentioned it to Donovan, who arranged to have Stark write a letterto the President which outlined the situation and recommended changing Ghormley’s designation toSPECNO. Roosevelt concurred with the decision. Recalling the situation years later, Kirk statedthat this in no way affected his working relationship with Ghormley, who was an old friend. Foradditional information see Harold Stark, ADM, Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum to thePresident of the United States, 8 August 1940; Kirk Papers, 1; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN,Letter to William Donovan, 14 August 1940, Kirk Papers, 1; Kirk Reminiscences, 166-167.255 Standardization of Arms Committee, “1st Meeting of the Anglo-American Standardization ofArms Committee,” 20 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-3; 5. Kirk and the U.S. Army AttachéCOL Raymond E. Lee, were also present at all of the Standardization of Arms Committee meetings.71