COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

clear to the Americans that if they were involved with the British in a waragainst Japan, all British Far East ports would be open to them and that leadershipof any joint action “would doubtless...be vested in the Commander of thelarger force,” thus making it clear that the British understood U.S. sensitivitiesabout their “junior partner” status in the Great War. 123 Significantly, from anintelligence perspective, Hampton also revealed details concerning the BritishHF/DF network in the Far East and, even more significantly, described the majorweakness of the system as the fact the network lacked “good angles” for crossfixingcontacts, but that the British felt adding the capabilities of their networkto those of the U.S. would be of advantage to both countries. 124 As with the offerto exchange intelligence on Japanese naval movements during the Ingersollvisit, this was another attempt on the part of the British to use the prospect ofcloser intelligence cooperation as one component of a many-layered approachdesigned to entice the U.S. into a closer partnership.Since these were not official talks, Leahy remained noncommittal, only revealinghis personal view that the U.S. would remain neutral as long as possible butassuring Hampton that, in the event of war, the U.S. would position its fleet inHawaii to deter Japanese aggression against U.S. interests, and that the U.S.would conduct air and sea patrols of the Western Atlantic, particularly in the Caribbeanand the Panama Canal Zone, to protect U.S. interests. 125 On 14 June,Hampton again met with Leahy and Ghormley to clarify some of the points raisedduring the 12 June meeting. Principally, he desired to understand more about theU.S. role in the Pacific and the Atlantic, inquiring whether the U.S. would bewilling to take the lead in the Pacific theater in the event of combined actionagainst the Axis. Once again, Leahy offered his personal opinion, stating that theU.S. would take the lead in the Pacific and that he expected the British to take thelead in the Atlantic theater except in the case of local submarine patrol areas offthe U.S. coast and in the Caribbean and the Panama Canal Zone. 126 While it iscorrect to say these talks produced no tangible results, they were important foranother reason. First, they indicate that the concerns that drove both countries toengage in the Ingersoll Mission were still valid over a year later. Second, theyclearly show that the British had come to the inescapable conclusion that the best,and possibly only, solution for their strategic dilemma was a cooperative, intelligence-intensivepartnership with America.123Robert L. Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum of an Informal Conversation Held at theResidence of the Chief of Naval Operations at 1700, 12 June 1939, Strategic Planning, 3. Citedhereafter Ghormley Memorandum, 12 June 1939.124 Ghormley Memorandum, 12 June 1939, Strategic Planning, 3.125 Ghormley Memorandum, 12 June 1939, Strategic Planning, 1-2.126 Robert L. Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum of an Informal Conversation Held at theResidence of the Chief of Naval Operations at 1700, 14 June 1939, Strategic Planning, 1-2.36