COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

Roosevelt did what was possible to aid the British in the period before thewar because maintaining British power would provide America the time itneeded to rearm itself. Still, actions taken prior to his election in 1940, such asthe institution of neutrality patrols, the resumption of the draft, and thedestroyer-for-bases deal were all met with some public opposition in the U.S.,which was why the staff talks and technical exchanges occurring between theU.S. and Great Britain were kept so secret. Although Roosevelt had greater freedomto act following his election, domestic politics still remained the great constrainingfactor on close relations between the two countries, a factor whichwould continue to cause tension between the U.S. and Great Britain up until thePearl Harbor attack. 133Frank KnoxConfirmed in July of 1940 as Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox has also beencalled an anglophile by some authors, although this assessment, just as withRoosevelt, understates the complexity of the situation. 134 Knox was a Republicanand had been publisher of the Chicago Daily News, where he advocated an activistapproach for American foreign policy as a necessary means of protecting U.S.national interests. 135 Knox was outraged that America had drawn down its militaryforces, as he believed that maintaining strength was the best way to maintainpeace. Given this attitude, it is clear that Knox, although he admired the British,was not inclined to let them dictate American policy. He clearly desired a navythat was the “strongest in the world.” 136 Like Roosevelt, he was a realist, as evidencedin a speech he made to the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce just after thestart of the World War II. He made it clear that America really had nothing to fearfrom a British-French victory but “despite these pro-British and French sympathies,we must...think first of the interests of the United States, and what policybest serves those interests.” 137 Later, as the Axis gained victory after victory onthe Continent, Knox broadcast an impassioned plea for a more interventionistpolicy for America in a speech that warned the American people that “It Is LaterThan You Think.” In that address, he lamented an unprepared America and133 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 114; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 8-9; Morison, The Battle of theAtlantic, 14-15, 33-34; Albion, 553-557; Reynolds, 64-65.134 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 10-11.135 Frank Knox, Publisher, Chicago Daily News, Letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 15 December1937, in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, December 1937-February 1938, ed. by DonaldB. Schewe (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979).136 Frank Knox, Speech to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, 24 October, 1939, in the Papersof Frank Knox, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 1-2.Cited hereafter as Knox, Speech to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce. Collection cited hereafteras Knox Papers.137 Frank Knox, Speech to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, Knox Papers, 1-2.39