PRESS

on, and seizure of, Taiwan’s offshore islands, while
the Chinese navy can “effectively blockade the Taiwan
Strait and seize near shore islands” and “blockade key
air space.” The air force, for its part, is currently “capable
of fighting for air superiority and control over
the first island chain,” which stretches from the Japanese
home islands through Taiwan and south to the
Philippines. 3
The report also highlights advances in China’s missile
force, notably, the fielding of advanced anti-ship
ballistic missiles and the deployment of more than
1,400 missiles with conventional warheads aimed
against Taiwan. The bottom line: “Combined with the
Navy and Air Force, the PLA is now capable of conducting
large scale joint firepower strikes and denying
foreign forces from intervening in disputes across the
Taiwan Strait.” 4
Together, these developments mark a major shift in
the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, not
all that long ago, the balance favored Taiwan. For example,
in 2000, Michael O’Hanlon argued that “China
cannot invade Taiwan, even under its most favorable
assumptions about how a conflict would unfold.” 5 According
to O’Hanlon, even coercive operations short
of a full-scale invasion would have been difficult for
the PLA to pull off.
In the MND’s previous National Defense Report, released
in 2011, negative trends were evident but not so
starkly stated. Now the MND assesses that the PLA is
only 6 years away from fielding an effective invasion
force, and that it can already prevent outside powers
from intervening in a timely way. How did Taiwan
arrive at this juncture?
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