PRESS

election outcomes, could influence the momentum
behind Abe’s initiative. Public debate and legislative
scrutiny—integral to Japan’s open democratic system—will
inevitably accompany this important shift
in defense policy. Change will come incrementally
through careful and transparent negotiations.
It is still unclear how the concept of limited collective
self-defense will translate into operational
practice for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Planned revisions
to the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, which spell out
the allied division of labor, will reportedly incorporate
an expanded defensive and logistical role for
the SDF. Due for completion at the end of 2014, the
guidelines called on the SDF to provide maintenance,
supplies, and fuel to American military units heading
into a combat zone—all rear-area activities that were
previously prohibited.
In addition to improving allied cooperation, the
cabinet decision could broaden the scope of the SDF’s
out-of-area operations. For example, the Abe administration
has identified minesweeping as a potentially
permissible action under UN Security Council authorization.
Given Japan’s dependence on energy from
the Persian Gulf region, the mining of the Strait of
Hormuz could constitute a clear threat to the nation’s
survival and well-being. This and other scenarios will
likely be the subject of further debate when the government
submits its legislative package to the Diet.
Japanese officials must strike a balance between
adhering to the constraints of the cabinet decision and
ensuring sufficient flexibility to account for the uncertainties
of real-world military contingencies. Limited
collective self-defense will open the door for Japanese
hard power to play a more effective and meaningful
role in maintaining regional and global security.
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