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Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. 39 NATO got into
the act as well, belatedly publishing the Allied Joint
Publication (AJP) 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency
(COIN) in February 2011. While describing
the need for a “comprehensive approach” involving
multiple civilian, political, and military organizations
and agencies in the COIN effort, the document focuses,
not surprisingly, on the political role played by
land forces in this asymmetric environment. 40
Undoubtedly, the most significant takeaway from
allied armies’ experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is
that the expertise of land forces has to be extended to
new domains. Originally devised simply to coerce the
enemy, armies in these environments will now have
responsibilities across a broad spectrum and, hence,
will need additional capabilities to address them effectively.
This means combining multiple approaches
to accomplishing strategic goals, emphasizing decentralized
command and control, effectively training indigenous
forces and, in general, being willing to work
in a joint forces setting and in conjunction with other
ministries to provide security in distinct regions, reassure
local populations, and rebuild social and governing
institutions to reattach the population to a legitimate
political authority.
Another key capability that has already proved its
worth is the security forces assistance mission. Successful
training missions can help prevent crises, help
failed states recover, shorten intervention times, and
facilitate the withdrawal of foreign allied forces.
From 2004 to 2011, NATO Training Mission-Iraq
trained more than 15,000 personnel with less than 200
trainers. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
(NTM-A) has been even more successful. At its peak,
NTM-A employed 2,800 trainers and was working
244