PRESS

with Japan occurs.” 7 However, in a compromise acknowledging
the New Komeito’s concerns, the Japanese
government attached three key conditions necessary
to invoke the right:
1. Only an attack or an impending attack that
“threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger
to fundamentally overthrow people’s right to life, liberty,
and pursuit of happiness” would meet the constitutional
standards for engaging in collective selfdefense.
2. Moreover, policymakers must determine that
“no other appropriate means” were available to counter
the threat to Japan.
3. Even then, the SDF must limit its use of force to
“the minimum extent necessary” to repel or defeat the
threat. 8
Abe’s cabinet further acknowledged that “prior
approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing
orders” to the SDF for collective self-defense missions.
9 By no means, has Japan been unshackled from
its constitutional restraints or from its exclusively
defensive orientation.
The cabinet decision represents just the first step
in what will likely be a deliberate political process to
operationalize this broader constitutional interpretation.
The Abe administration will need to submit a
legislative package to the Diet that would provide the
proper legal framework for the SDF to help assist or
defend allies and friends, should they come under attack.
At least 10 existing laws would be reviewed, updated,
and revised in this process. Opposition parties
will have another chance to litigate the issue.
In the meantime, changes in popular opinion or
other domestic political developments, such as local
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