PRESS

Going forward, however, Stokes argues that
Taiwan needs a “survivable network of sensors”
for “pervasive and persistent surveillance,” which
might include earth observation satellites, “manned
or unoccupied airborne sensors,” and passive and
active ground- and maritime-based sensors. 33 The
MND shares a similar vision for its ISR capabilities.
According to the most recent QDR, to enhance ISR,
Taiwan will:
effectively employ mid- and long-range electronic
surveillance systems, extend ground, sea and air
surveillance capabilities, integrate C2 systems, establish
COP, and share battlefield information to
enhance early warning capacity and battlefield
transparency. 34
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Setting aside Taipei’s difficulties in meeting its
own defense spending targets, Taiwan faces two other
significant obstacles to fielding the kind of force it envisions.
First, the military’s transition to an all-volunteer
force faces major implementation problems and
threatens to consume too many of the defense dollars
that Taiwan does spend. Second, Taiwan continues
to rely on defense articles from the United States at a
time when Washington has a decreasing appetite for
selling Taiwan the weapons it most needs and has an
increasingly different vision than Taipei of Taiwan’s
optimal defensive strategy.
The All-Volunteer Force.
On its face, the rationale behind Taiwan’s transition
to an all-volunteer force makes sense. With Taiwan’s
low birthrate leading over time to a smaller labor force
218