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also require Taiwan to outsource the job of countering coercive uses of force short of invasion, when no other country (including the United States) has made a binding commitment to assume that responsibility. Taiwan’s own strategy, explicated in its QDR and biennial national defense reports, is less narrowly focused. Taiwan’s armed forces have identified a need to counter China across the possible spectrum of coercive scenarios and in all domains of warfare. The MND argues that it can adopt innovative asymmetric approaches to doing so, but it does not consider hunkering down during a blockade or missile barrage to be a realistic option, for reasons of deterrence or domestic politics. IS SECURITY WITHIN REACH? Taiwan faces significant impediments to fielding a force capable of carrying out its stated military strategy and, thus, to ensuring its security. The challenges are few but significant: declining budgets, questions about the viability of an all-volunteer force, uneven and uncertain relations with the United States, and, of course, the existence of an increasingly imposing military force across the Taiwan Strait. But no less an issue is the political-rhetorical problem in which Taiwan finds itself. To please Washington—Taiwan’s only real security partner—and to claim success in managing cross-Strait relations, Taipei has had to argue that those relations are better than they have ever been. Of course, in some respects that is accurate. However, it has not lessened the actual military threat posed by mainland China to Taiwan. Simply put, Taiwan’s government must do a better job of explaining that its policy of engaging with the 224
mainland does not eliminate the need to provide the island with an effective defense; indeed, only when Taiwan is secure can it, over the long run, engage China with confidence. Given China’s assertive actions in the East and South China Seas and the more forceful and ambitious leadership of China’s new president, Xi Jinping, addressing this shortcoming is more urgent than ever. ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9 1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on April 24, 2014. 2. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96–8, 96th Cong., April 10, 1979. 3. Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China, National Defense Report 2013, pp. 58, 60, 61, 66, available from report. mnd.gov.tw/en/m/minister.html. 4. Ibid., p. 62. 5. Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, p. 82. 6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, available from www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 7. Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2014, p. 34, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf. 8. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 9. Kan, pp. 33-34. 225
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GARY J. SCHMITT EDITOR UNITED STATE
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Str
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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9. Taiwanese Hard Power: Between a
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United States. It no longer retains
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the main action in Iraq from 2003 t
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fort to provide an accurate, well-r
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However, Italy remains one of the w
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Source: Data derived from Internati
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Under new austerity measures, Italy
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and even missiles for its planes. I
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Indeed, at the turn of the century,
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not been reversed, and, as predicte
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force, especially in the cases of I
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On the ground, Italy’s contributi
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But in an area nearly half the size
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eliminated military overhead and th
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the next half-decade. Although new
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how it will involve the country in
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6. The last white paper was publish
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21. For an overview of Italy’s mi
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CHAPTER 3 AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE IN THE
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the following decade. 2 It outlined
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ument’s strong association with R
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The second prominent theme of the 2
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Source: “The Cost of Defense: ASP
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• Acquiring P-8 Poseidon maritime
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e until 2016 that all of the submar
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Canberra will remain acutely sensit
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a range of over 200 nautical miles.
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ADF needs to be postured to support
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Southeast Asia, and enhanced access
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Assuming that the base of support f
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defense cuts and predicted revenue
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5. WikiLeaks cables subsequently re
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Appropriations Specified by Outcome
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48. Defence White Paper 2013, pp. 4
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CHAPTER 4 THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
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cially with respect to blue-water o
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permitted relatively rapid degradat
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necessary to equip them, in additio
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Sources: International Institute fo
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sion frigate (FREMM) program. (At o
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Chief of Staff of the Navy Vice Adm
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With a moderately rising defense bu
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fleet size. Insufficient funds in 2
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Sources: International Institute fo
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The desire to maintain a balanced f
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Presse, August 4, 2011, available f
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16. Nicholas Watt, “Next Generati
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147. See also, “Chapter Four: Eur
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CHAPTER 5 GERMAN HARD POWER: IS THE
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Every German security policy expert
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4 years. In relation to its overall
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crisis, starting in 2008, did not h
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System Current or orginally planned
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In assessing this strategy and its
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odds with de Maizière’s plea to
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Second, the development of German h
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efrain from engaging the enemy. In
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most observers applaud this bold co
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do so, the government would need th
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13. For a critique of the “missin
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CHAPTER 6 SOUTH KOREA: RESPONDING T
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INITIATIVES AGAINST THE NORTH KOREA
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has been equipped with the best mar
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sile 6 (SM-6) for low-altitude defe
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The accord governing South Korean p
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BUDGETS AND ACQUISITIONS: PAYING FO
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the ministry submitted a request to
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was both premature and dangerous to
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In June 2010, Presidents Lee and Ba
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Although many details still needed
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in production the U.S. and South Ko
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April 7, 2013, available from www.n
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21. Karen Parrish, “Leaving Asia,
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www/news/nation/2009/04/113_42785.h
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51. Hwang Sung-hee, “Korea, U.S.
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essential to Poland’s security, t
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gross domestic product (GDP) on def
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whenever possible, there will be co
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Source: Ministry of National Defenc
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Air and missile defenses (AMD), how
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MSBS 5.56 program to develop a new
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eration among the Nordic, Baltic, a
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and EU membership for Poland’s se
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will rely on the United States to f
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The government seems aware of the r
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5. In 2011, Poland’s GDP grew 4.5
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20. If true, the deployment of Iska
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Page 254 and 255: Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency
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Defence White Paper continued, “W
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These eight tasks capture the wide-
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no passing craze: it outlasted the
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Strategic ambivalence is a national
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As the basis for national strategy,
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14. Strategic Defence Review, Londo
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CHAPTER 12 POOLING AND SHARING: THE
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such arrangements existed before th
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non-NATO countries and that has an
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An important ongoing program area f
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arrangements typically involve nati
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testing facilities, defense researc
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In addition, nations working togeth
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ilities, in military doctrines, in
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informing allies or NATO. Thus, und
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also facilitate industry involvemen
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cessfully managed without underlyin
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ment,” January 24, 2007, availabl
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18. See “Netherlands, Belgium and
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30. It should be kept in mind that
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Understanding how Japanese policyma
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Indeed, Prime Minister Abe can look
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with Japan occurs.” 7 However, in
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JAPAN’S NEIGHBORHOOD GETS ROUGHER
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China has taken actions that can be
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THE DYNAMIC JOINT DEFENSE FORCE Chi
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ticularly important functions and c
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2010, Tokyo announced its plan to i
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Japan is also developing its own st
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It is worth noting that these moder
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to Amami Ōshima, which is near the
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In 2009, the subcommittee of the de
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society have intensified competitio
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STRATEGY—RESOURCE MISMATCH? Beyon
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nese interests in other parts of th
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WILL JAPAN RISE TO THE CHALLENGE? C
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11. Kosuke Takahashi and James Hard
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34. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and
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can capabilities necessarily lead o
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NATO has streamlined and concentrat
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still fly older but very capable ai
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Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base as th
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interceptors and sensors, hosting a
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NATO nations continue decreasing de
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The UK and Italy provided remotely
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National Caveats. Once NATO becomes
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in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2
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Airpower is the most rapid response
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at long ranges and with heavy preci
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in air operations and challenged NA
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14 1. This chapt
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from www.theguardian.com/world/2014
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41. Joint Air Power Competence Cent
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ANDREW A. MICHTA is the M. W. Buckm
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of Key U.S. Allies and Security Par
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