PRESS

But in an area nearly half the size of Italy and containing
more than 2.5 million Afghans, the resources the
Italian forces had been provided in manpower, firepower,
and transport meant that, even in conjunction
with allied forces in the region, fulfilling the ISAF mission
of “securing” the region became an increasingly
improbable task.
As a result of pressure from both its own military
and ISAF allies, Rome did increase the size of the Italian
force in RC-West and provided more assistance in
terms of armor, jet aircraft, air transport, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and attack helicopters. This gave the
Italians a greater capacity to engage in blocking operations
as the Taliban fled from ISAF operations in
nearby Helmand into RC-West and, in a limited number
of cases, to participate in operations designed to
clear pockets of Taliban in their area of responsibility.
Nevertheless, it is also the case that Italian governments—both
of the left and the right—have not wanted
Italian soldiers to participate in operations in the
more dangerous areas in the south or the east regions
of the country. It was only in 2008 that the Italian government
modified its caveat that Rome would have to
approve any and all requests for Italian forces to assist
coalition forces outside of RC-West by lowering the
time allotted for it to respond from 72 hours to 6.
As with other ISAF contributors, Italy has begun
to draw down the numbers deployed to Afghanistan.
Because it is pressed financially, Rome would like to
reduce the Italian deployment by 1,200 over the next
year and gradually wind down force levels to no more
than 800 to 1000 troops in country by the end of 2014,
with 2014 being the year the Afghan government
takes the lead in providing security throughout the
country. 27
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