PRESS

sions), its airspace, and its territorial waters and is
much more concerned with addressing strategic challenges
to the UK at those challenges’ point of origin.
In his introduction to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review
(SDR), then-secretary of state for defense George Robertson
argued that “[i]n the post-Cold War world, we
must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have
the crisis come to us.” 2 This notion of self defense at
arm’s length subsequently became a leitmotif in UK
national strategy, attracting bipartisan consensus.
The first and most obvious indicator of the strength
and scope of UK hard power is the amount Her Majesty’s
Government spends on the country’s military
force posture. The next indicator is capabilities: the
platforms, equipment, weaponry, and personnel necessary
for military commitments and for what are now
described as expeditionary operations. Hard power is
also reputational, concerned with the nation’s experience
with military operations and those operations’
effectiveness. Finally, hard power is the expression of
foreign policy outlook and strategic intent.
Although national strategy is concerned with the
future, a nation’s strategic posture—particularly its
hard power—cannot develop in an instant and must
evolve over time. This chapter covers the 15-year period
from July 1998 to December 2013, beginning with
the publication of the newly elected Labour Party government’s
SDR, which marked the beginning of a new,
genuinely post-Cold War era in strategic UK thinking.
UK MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Military expenditure can be surprisingly difficult
to track, as accounting procedures change from time
to time. Nevertheless, it offers some indication of a
country’s intentions and seriousness.
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