PRESS

nese interests in other parts of the world remain remote,
ill-defined, and of indefinite duration. Whether
the Japanese government can allocate resources deftly
enough to balance traditional against nontraditional
military functions remains uncertain. If Tokyo fails
to prioritize, then it is entirely possible that Japanese
political ends will outstrip ways and means.
JAPAN’S LOOMING DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS
Over the long term, Tokyo will confront a structural
and virtually irreversible challenge to its hard
power. Japan’s rapidly aging society is pushing the
nation toward an unprecedented demographic crisis
that could have dire implications for its defense posture
in the coming decades. Owing to low fertility,
high life expectancy, and trifling immigration, Japan
will be significantly older and smaller in 2030 than it
is today. The population will likely decline from 128
million in 2010 to 116 million 20 years hence, averaging
a loss of more than 660,000 Japanese citizens
per year.
During this same period, Japan’s working-age
population (ages 15 to 64) will shrink by 17 percent,
from 81 million to 67 million. The median age of the
population will rise from 45 to 50, and about a third
of the population will be over 65 years old by 2030.
Some forecasts estimate that Japan’s population may
shrink to 90 million by mid-century, representing an
astounding 30 percent decrease from its peak years in
the late-2000s. 35
Population decline inevitably reduces the pool of
manpower available for military service. The figures
are sobering. The male population eligible to join the
SDF (ages 18 to 26) peaked at 9 million in 1994. In
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