PRESS

Here, there may be tension with the “credible deterrence”
aspect of Taiwan’s military strategy. As with
“resolute defense,” the QDR’s definition of “credible
deterrence” is problematic:
The ROC Armed Forces should continue force training
and combat preparation, effectively integrate the
interoperability of weapon systems, enhance joint operational
performance, and exert overall warfighting
capabilities, forcing the enemy to consider the costs
and risks of war, thereby deterring any hostile intention
to launch an invasion. 19
First, it is unclear what Taiwan’s military intends
to hold at risk that would effectively deter China. In
contemplating an invasion, Beijing can be expected as
a matter of course to consider the costs and risks of
war. The QDR fails to explain how Taiwan will raise
those costs and deepen those risks. Second, the military
presumably wants to deter not only a full-scale
invasion but also a missile barrage, blockade, or other
coercive use of force. The omission is curious.
Looking beyond the “resolute defense, credible deterrence”
slogan, however, the QDR offers more concrete
plans for contending with the PLA. In particular,
the QDR describes requirements to counter a blockade
of the sea or air lines of communication, for joint interdiction
of forces approaching from mainland China,
and for ground forces capable of denying Chinese
forces from establishing a beachhead.
The QDR goes on to emphasize the need for the continued
development of joint warfighting capabilities
based on the military’s “innovative and asymmetric”
concept, which recognizes that Taiwan cannot compete
with China on quantitative grounds and should
develop capabilities to target China’s weaknesses.
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