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at long ranges and with heavy precision payloads and
long target loiter times. Because of declining budgets
and NATO nations’ closer proximity to their likely areas
of operation, it is probably beyond the scope of
any single NATO nation to procure such a capability.
But could NATO nations agree to a commonly
funded long-range bomber capability using a model
such as the NAEW&C, NATO AGS, or even the non-
NATO HAW? At a minimum, it is important that
NATO maintain bases capable of hosting forwarddeployed
U.S. bombers. As the United States designs
and procures a new long-range bomber, it must consult
closely with NATO allies to ensure that some existing
and future NATO airfields can host the aircraft.
A Common Vision of Strategic Threats.
Is the resurgence of Russia in the East or the terrorist
threats emanating from Africa and the Middle
East the main strategic threat to NATO? Arguably,
both are. Therefore, non-U.S. NATO air forces must
train for both high-end and counterinsurgency-type
conflict. Strategic and tactical ISR platforms are crucial
to both efforts, so non-U.S. NATO nations must maintain
ISR investment strategies for the future. The Chicago
NATO summit in May 2012 reinforced the need
to strengthen multinational cooperation—in particular,
on some strategic programs, including the AGS
program. At a press briefing on March 5, 2012, NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:
We will target a number of strategic projects for 2020
and beyond. As our operation in Libya showed, we
still face some specific capability gaps, such as air-toair
refueling and joint intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance. And we know that we will need stron-
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