PRESS

adaptability and capacity to engage in a broad range
of missions is thus part of the resources that government
leaders must still have if they hope to meet their
respective countries’ larger foreign policy goals. 45 War
weary or not, NATO members are ignoring tactical
and strategic realities—and, indeed, history—if they
believe that continuing to drain their land forces of
numbers and capabilities is either wise or sustainable.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10
1. This chapter was originally published as an essay on June
4, 2014.
2. Jonathan Marcus, “NATO Commander Philip Breedlove
on Post-Afghan Future,” BBC News, July 3, 2013, available from
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23157256.
3. Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, “Stratégie, ‘opératique’
et tactique: La place des forces terrestres” (“‘Operatic’ Strategy
and Tactics: The Place of Ground Forces”), December 2005,
available from www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/anciennespublications/articles-sur-le-retex/retex-doctrine/doctrine-07;
Charles
Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block
War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999, available from www.au.af.
mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm; and Rupert Smith,
The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, London,
UK: Allen Lane, 2005.
4. Elrick Irastorza, “Forces armées: peut-on encore réduire un
format ‘juste insuffisant’?” (“Armed Forces: Can a “Just Enough”
Format Be Further Reduced?”), Paris, France: French Senate,
Commission on Foreign Affairs and Defense, July 18, 2012, available
from www.senat.fr/rap/r11-680/r11-680_mono.html.
5. Christian Mölling, “Europe without Defense,” Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, November 2011, available from www.isn.ethz.
ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=135191&lng=en.
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