PRESS

informing allies or NATO. Thus, under current circumstances,
important NATO capabilities can be
weakened without any advance opportunity to consider
how they might be maintained in different ways.
Such advance notice can allow time for an assessment
to be made regarding the nature and extent of
any effect of a reduction in collective transatlantic
military capabilities. A dedicated evaluation center,
such as a consortium of independent policy organizations,
should be established. This center could assess
national plans and their effect on collective capacities
and could suggest alternative approaches—including
pooling and sharing—that might maintain or develop
a needed capability.
6. It bears repeating that the EU and NATO must
avoid redundancy. There are simply insufficient resources
for the organizations to be undertaking duplicative
projects. At the same time, both organizations
should strive to identify synergies.
In theory, both organizations recognize the need
for enhanced coordination. The 2012 NATO summit
specifically endorsed European programs to strengthen
air-to-air refueling capacities. Further, NATO’s Allied
Command Transformation (ACT) has developed
a number of potential pooling-and-sharing projects
that consult with the EDA. In addition, NATO and the
EU meet regularly in the EU-NATO Capability Group
to discuss common capability requirements. NATO’s
ACT and the EU’s EDA are also in regular contact. 23
There may also be programs that NATO chooses
not to pursue that would nonetheless enhance overall
transatlantic security or provide capabilities helpful
for localized contingencies. In this regard, the EDA
Code of Conduct’s call for giving pooling-and-sharing
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