PRESS

awareness of all units operating around the Southwest
Islands. Above all, Japanese warships, submarines,
and fighters must ensure sea control and air superiority,
without which amphibious operations and island
defense would founder. Mutual support among the
three services in a complex operational environment
is thus essential to success.
A CONVENTIONAL COUNTERSTRIKE OPTION?
If the military balance continues to tilt in Beijing’s
favor, Tokyo could feel compelled to deter by punishment,
which could entail inflicting unacceptable levels
of pain on China should the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) ever attack Japan and Japanese forces. To retaliate
directly against China with such force, Japan
would have to develop offensive strike capabilities
designed to hold at risk a range of assets, especially
those on the mainland that Beijing highly values. In
theory, Tokyo’s ability to impose prohibitive costs on
China would deter the Chinese military from acting
in the first place. Dating back to the 1950s, Japanese
debates about the constitutionality of attacking enemy
territory suggest that a decision to pursue deterrence
by punishment is not far-fetched.
While an offensive posture would no doubt stoke
political controversy, serious debates about acquiring
land attack cruise missiles have surfaced in Japan
from time to time since at least 2005. 26 The discourse
has centered primarily on the legalities of Tokyo’s
hypothetical decision to attack North Korean missile
bases in the event of a crisis. But it can be assumed
that Japan would not limit the missile’s use to Pyongyang
if Japan ever acquired such a weapon system.
337