PRESS

precision strike, unmanned combat air vehicles, and
similar features. These equipment and platforms are
of interest not only because they are often less costly
to operate than their conventional equivalents, but
also because they offer a degree of political deniability
that is not so readily available when there are boots
on the ground. Technological warfare might even be
considered morally preferable in that it should mean
fewer troops being exposed to the risks of combat.
In some respects, strategic ambivalence is to be
welcomed. At its most constructive, ambivalence
could be the basis of a national strategy based on risk
analysis and management—an approach that is most
appropriate when national strategy must respond not
only to a diverse range of security threats and challenges
but also to scarcity and austerity.
Yet where matters of hard power are concerned, a
national strategy based on ambivalence and risk must
be deliberate rather than accidental and must involve
careful and difficult decisions rather than expect to
avoid them altogether. For a risk-based national strategy
to be effective, it will require serious thought and
investment in capabilities such as intelligence gathering,
early warning, and communications. 33 It remains
to be seen whether the UK government will remain
meaningfully committed to a risk-based national
strategy.
In his first speech as chief of the defense staff in
December 2013, General Sir Nick Houghton observed
that “[UK] Defence has for many years, certainly since
the end of the Cold War, and in strong international
company within Europe, been managing the decline
of military hard power.” 34 But managed decline is not
the same as decline; there must be strategic capacity
and purpose in whatever remains of the process—
however inevitable—of retrenchment.
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