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Table 1:<br />

160<br />

Chinese Attempted and Completed Acquisitions and Investments<br />

in U.S. Semiconductor Companies, 2015–2016—Continued<br />

U.S. Target<br />

Specialty<br />

Chinese<br />

Investor<br />

Value<br />

(US$<br />

millions)<br />

Status<br />

Analogix<br />

Semiconductor<br />

Designer of highspeed,<br />

mixed-signal<br />

chips for use<br />

in high-performance<br />

displays<br />

such as mobile<br />

devices, virtual<br />

and augmented<br />

reality, and other<br />

products<br />

Beijing<br />

Shanhai<br />

Capital<br />

Management,<br />

National IC<br />

Industry<br />

Investment<br />

Fund<br />

$500 Announced<br />

merger,<br />

September 2016<br />

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with USCC<br />

Sources: Various. 165<br />

Beyond significant investment, Mr. Goodrich outlined additional<br />

policies impacting U.S. semiconductor firms’ operations in China:<br />

government-funded R&D grants, state-guided procurement orders,<br />

technology transfer requirements, China-specific standards, cybersecurity<br />

trade barriers,* encryption limitations, and security testing<br />

and licensing. 166 These policies support domestic firms while<br />

limiting U.S. semiconductor firms’ market access to their largest<br />

customer. In order to gain and maintain market access, U.S. and<br />

other foreign firms appear to be acceding to Chinese demands to<br />

transfer technology and form joint ventures with its firms. Recent<br />

examples of China leveraging market access in exchange for technology<br />

include:<br />

Qualcomm: In February 2015, the National Development and<br />

Reform Commission, China’s chief industrial policymaking agency<br />

and regulatory body, fined Qualcomm—the world’s largest producer<br />

of smartphone chips—$975 million for allegedly using its dominant<br />

market share to overcharge Chinese telecommunications firms for<br />

its patent royalties.† This fine was the largest penalty ever imposed<br />

on a company by the Chinese government. 167 In addition to<br />

paying the fine, Qualcomm agreed to offer 3G and 4G licenses at<br />

a lower price in China than Qualcomm’s normal wholesale figure.<br />

Moreover, Qualcomm would provide these licenses separately from<br />

its other patents and permit existing licensees to take advantage<br />

of the new sales terms in January 2015. Qualcomm also agreed to<br />

no longer require chip customers to sign a licensing agreement<br />

with ‘‘unreasonable conditions,’’ as determined by the National Development<br />

and Reform Commission, prior to the sale of baseband<br />

chips. 168<br />

Qualcomm, reliant on the Chinese market for nearly half its revenue,<br />

169 launched a ‘‘globalization’’ unit in May 2015 to assist Chinese<br />

smartphone makers—such as Huawei and Xiaomi—in expand-<br />

* For more information on the impact of China’s cybersecurity barriers on U.S. firms, see U.S.-<br />

China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 1, Section 4, ‘‘Commercial Cyber Espionage<br />

and Barriers to Digital Trade in China,’’ in 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November<br />

2015, 210–217.<br />

† For more information on the antimonopoly case, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review<br />

Commission, Chapter 1, Section 2, ‘‘Foreign Investment Climate in China,’’ in 2015 Annual<br />

Report to Congress, November 2015, 96–97.<br />

VerDate Sep 11 2014 12:16 Nov 02, 2016 Jkt 020587 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2016\FINAL\06_C1_C2_M.XXX 06_C1_C2_M

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