ANNUAL REPORT

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The Tsai Administration’s policy toward the disputes in the East
and South China seas * has been similar so far to that of the Ma
Administration, which proposed diplomatic frameworks and signed
agreements with other claimants to encourage the setting aside of
territorial disputes and promotion of joint resource development.
The most recent agreement was reached between Taiwan and the
Philippines in November 2015, with the two sides achieving consensus
on ‘‘avoiding the use of violence or unnecessary force, establishment
of an emergency notification system, and establishment of
a prompt release mechanism’’ for fishermen from one country who
are detained by the other. 133 In March 2016, Taiwan and the Philippines
agreed to establish a hotline to notify each other of fishing
accidents, to conduct joint inspections of fishing boats, and to exchange
inspection reports. 134 Keeping with the spirit of these previous
endeavors, in her inaugural address President Tsai said, ‘‘Regarding
problems arising in the East China Sea and South China
Sea, we propose setting aside disputes so as to enable joint development.’’
135 Later, in June, the Tsai Administration announced that
it was establishing a maritime affairs cooperation dialogue with the
Japanese government to address the dispute between Taiwan fishermen
and the Japanese government over rights to fish at
Okinotori Atoll, a land feature in the East China Sea that Japan
asserts is entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone
and that Taiwan and China believe does not have this right, among
other issues. 136
Taiwan Military and Security Issues
Cross-Strait Military Balance
As the Tsai Administration took office, it faced the challenges of
a Chinese military modernization program that had dramatically
increased despite eight years of enhanced cross-Strait economic,
people-to-people, and government ties. Broadly, the cross-Strait
military balance has shifted toward China. 137 The People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) possesses both a quantitative and a qualitative
military advantage over the Taiwan military and is capable of conducting
a range of military campaigns against Taiwan.
• The PLA Rocket Force (previously the Second Artillery Force)
has approximately 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles and
200–500 ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles.† 138 According
to congressional testimony by U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency Director Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart in
February 2015, all of China’s short-range ballistic missiles are
deployed across from Taiwan. 139 The primary purpose of the
majority of these missiles is to deter a move toward formal
independence by Taiwan or to destroy Taiwan’s ports and air-
* Taiwan is one of three claimants to the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyutai in Taiwan
and Diaoyu in China) in the East China Sea. The other claimants are China and Japan.
† Official U.S. and Taiwan estimates of China’s number of short-range ballistic missiles and
land-attack cruise missiles vary. According to the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense’s August
2015 report on China’s military power for the Legislative Yuan, China has 1,700 ballistic and
cruise missiles, and 1,500 of these missiles are deployed against Taiwan. Senate Armed Services
Committee, Hearing on Worldwide Threats, written testimony of Vincent R. Stewart, February
26, 2015; Zhu Ming, ‘‘Ministry of National Defense: China Keeps 1,500 Missiles Deployed
against Taiwan,’’ Storm Media (Taiwan), August 31, 2015. Staff translation.
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