ANNUAL REPORT

14
cluding cyber and human intelligence collection operations. In many
reported cases in recent years, espionage operations by both the
MSS and PLA have targeted national security organizations in the
United States and in U.S. ally and partner countries. Chinese intelligence
services seek to collect a wide range of information, from
second-hand and unclassified information to classified information
extracted directly from operatives within leading U.S. national security
organizations. Through the use of financial incentives and
coercion, MSS and PLA intelligence units build networks of agents
within and outside of China working as diplomats, defense attachés,
and academics, among other roles. These organizations are pursuing
more aggressive human intelligence operations and—in a significant
departure from their past approach to human intelligence operations—increasingly
are recruiting agents outside of mainland China.
China’s military technical intelligence collection capabilities are
growing as well. China operates an increasingly sophisticated and
extensive array of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets
capable of monitoring U.S. forces deployed to the Western Pacific.
To coordinate and synthesize the use of these assets, the PLA
appears to be moving toward greater jointness between intelligence
units in different branches of the PLA. Moreover, as part of the
broader reform of the PLA, China has reorganized many elements
of PLA intelligence and created the Strategic Support Force, a new
branch of the PLA that most likely will take on and centralize components
of the PLA’s intelligence mission.
The U.S. government response to the threat from Chinese intelligence
collection has suffered from the lack of an integrated, coordinated
effort within the U.S. Intelligence Community. The U.S.
government’s efforts to counter Chinese intelligence collection operations
have manifested largely as a series of espionage prosecutions
rather than a strategic, whole-of-government response. The Obama
Administration has taken steps to improve cybersecurity among
U.S. government agencies and defense contractors, but these measures
could mitigate, not eliminate, the significant cyber espionage
threats to these organizations.
Conclusions
• Chinese intelligence has repeatedly infiltrated U.S. national
security entities and extracted information with serious consequences
for U.S. national security, including information on
the plans and operations of U.S. military forces and the designs
of U.S. weapons and weapons systems. This information could
erode U.S. military superiority by aiding China’s military modernization
and giving China insight into the operation of U.S.
platforms and the operational approaches of U.S. forces to potential
contingencies in the region.
• China’s growing technical intelligence collection capabilities
could strengthen China’s hand in a contingency. Its extensive
network of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets and continued development and deployment of increasingly
advanced ISR platforms will increase the People’s Liberation
Army’s (PLA) ability to monitor U.S. forces. Moreover, the
enhanced jointness of PLA intelligence at the theater level will