ANNUAL REPORT

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pressure is more likely to bring about regime collapse than
denuclearization, and regime collapse is not what Chinese
leaders want to see. 168
Implications for the United States
Unwilling to apply the full force of its leverage on Pyongyang,
but unable to ignore U.S. and international appeals for cooperation
on North Korea, Beijing pursues the status quo, doling out occasional
punishments to the Kim regime. This necessarily leaves the
United States and the international community hamstrung in encouraging
change in North Korea. In addition, China’s continued
economic assistance to North Korea creates greater instability in
Northeast Asia by facilitating the Kim regime’s missile and nuclear
weapons development. Beijing states that its goal is to realize a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula, but its actions suggest otherwise.
Indeed, Beijing’s enabling of the Kim regime as a bulwark
against U.S. and allied influence and power on the Korean Peninsula
appears to be backfiring, as the United States, South Korea,
and Japan pursue greater defense and intelligence cooperation and
enhance their military capabilities against North Korea. 169 Following
North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear test, President
Obama reiterated to Seoul and Tokyo ‘‘the unshakable U.S. commitment
to take necessary steps to defend our allies in the region,
including through the deployment of a [THAAD] battery to [South
Korea], and the commitment to provide extended deterrence, guaranteed
by the full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities.’’ 170 South
Korea and Japan are increasingly concerned with North Korea’s escalating
threat. Tokyo has been exploring expanded missile defense
capabilities for some time now, and North Korea’s recent provocations
appear to be lending these discussions more urgency. 171
China’s mistrust of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and its unique
security priorities vis-à-vis North Korea restrict its level of engagement
with South Korea and the United States in discussions about
North Korea collapse scenarios and contingency planning. 172 As a
result, the countries most likely to intervene in North Korea in the
event of regime collapse—the United States, China, and South
Korea—are not fully informed of each other’s intentions, which
could lead to accidents, miscalculation, and conflict in the event of
a contingency.
China’s enforcement of UNSCR 2270 and its reaction to the
THAAD deployment are still unfolding, while as of the publication
of this Report, Beijing has stated that the next UN resolution following
the September nuclear test should include tightened sanctions.
173 If the past is any indication, China can be expected to unevenly
enforce UNSCR 2270 and the forthcoming round of sanctions
in a way that will not seriously destabilize the Kim regime.
The impact of THAAD is less clear, though in the near term it
likely will encourage greater cooperation between Beijing and
Pyongyang and cause increased tensions between China and the
United States and South Korea.
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