ANNUAL REPORT

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with USCC
216
China the minimum SSBN force required to maintain a near continuous
at-sea nuclear deterrent presence in peacetime. 188
Conducting nuclear deterrence patrols likely will require a series
of procedures to be in place prior to SSBN patrol activity. For example,
DOD states ‘‘SSBN deterrence patrols will force the PLA to
implement more sophisticated [command and control] systems and
processes that safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority
for a larger, more dispersed force.’’ 189 China’s policy of keeping nuclear
warheads stored separately from missiles in order to prevent
an accident or unauthorized use (known as ‘‘de-alerting’’) 190 will
likewise require revision for JL–2 SLBMs to be deployed on submarines
during peacetime. 191 China may also be enhancing peacetime
readiness levels for these nuclear forces to ensure responsiveness,
192 which may be applied to China’s SSBN force as well.
PLA Exercises and Training
China views conducting joint and transregional exercises as key
to narrowing the gap between training and real combat experience
for the PLA. 193 The PLA conducts exercises to enhance warfighting
competencies, test and evaluate tactics, develop and refine integrated
joint operations command structures and concepts, and
evaluate service proficiencies. 194 The overall objective of PLA exercises
is to develop an effective operational capability to achieve success
in local wars under ‘‘informationized’’ conditions.*
Evolution of PLA Exercises for Joint Operations
While the development of joint integrated operations has been a
focus of PLA modernization objectives since the late 1990s, it was
not until the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001 to 2005) that the PLA initiated
its program to develop a credible joint operation concept. 195
Mark Cozad, a senior international defense policy analyst with the
RAND Corporation, states that during this period, China pursued
a ‘‘multifaceted effort . . . that brought together a broad body of
military science research, technology development, new training
guidelines, and operational experimentation.’’ 196 This phase of
joint exercise development culminated with Sharp Sword-2005, an
exercise that experimented with air-land integration and firepower
strike coordination between the army and air force. 197 Mr. Cozad
argues that although this ‘‘exercise highlighted several shortcomings
in the PLA’s capability to perform integrated joint operations,
it marked a significant foundational basis on which followon
efforts would build.’’ 198 Between 2006 and 2008, China continued
to refine and experiment with joint operational concepts that
contributed to the revision of the Outline on Military Training and
Evaluation, which provides training guidance to the PLA. 199 The
revised Outline, released by the then General Staff Department in
January 2009, emphasized realistic training, joint training, and
training under complex electromagnetic environments. 200 PLA joint
training then entered a ‘‘standardized development’’ phase between
2009 and 2010 to test joint operation concepts that emerged from
* In Chinese military doctrine, ‘‘informationization’’ refers to the application of advanced information
technology to military operations. The PLA views informationization as a required enabler
of its goal to be able to win ‘‘local wars under informationized conditions.’’
VerDate Sep 11 2014 12:16 Nov 02, 2016 Jkt 020587 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2016\FINAL\06_C1_C2_M.XXX 06_C1_C2_M