ANNUAL REPORT

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the South China Sea, China will be able to use them as persistent
civil-military bases to enhance its long-term presence in
the South China Sea significantly.’’ 156 Because of these activities,
some countries in the region—such as Vietnam and the
Philippines—have increased military modernization efforts and
support for U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South
China Sea. 157
• Chinese South China Sea presence operations and coercion:
China is using coercion to enhance its presence and control in
disputed areas in the South China Sea. Beijing continues to
employ China Coast Guard and PLA Navy ships to enforce
claims by maintaining presence in disputed areas. 158 The land
reclamation in the South China Sea will support China’s ability
to sustain these presence operations. 159 The Congressional
Research Service reports that South China Sea territorial disputes
have ‘‘intensified in the past few years, leading to numerous
confrontations and incidents involving fishing vessels,
oil exploration vessels and oil rigs, coast guard ships, naval
ships, and military aircraft. The intensification of the disputes
. . . has substantially heightened tensions between China and
other countries in the region, particularly . . . the Philippines
. . . and Vietnam.’’ 160 As with its land reclamation activities,
China’s military and law enforcement coercion operations have
had a similar effect. For example, Vietnam is seeking U.S. defense
equipment to improve the capability of the Vietnamese
military to monitor and respond to Chinese challenges in the
South China Sea. 161
According to an interlocutor with whom the Commission met
during its June 2016 trip to China and India, India is concerned
about China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean. 162
• Submarine deployments: Abhijit Singh, an analyst with the Institute
for Defense Studies in India, notes that since a ‘‘Yuanclass
submarine visited Karachi [in 2015], New Delhi has been
worried over the possibility of a Chinese takeover of its maritime
neighborhood. In the [guise] of antipiracy operations, Indian
observers believe, Chinese submarines have been performing
specific standalone missions—a process meant to lay
the groundwork for a rotating but permanent deployment in
the Indian Ocean.’’ 163
• PLA Navy surface combatant deployments: In 2014 the PLA
Navy conducted its first far seas deployment in the Indian
Ocean, and carried out exercises first in the South China Sea
and then in the eastern Indian Ocean with a three-ship task
force. 164 Furthermore, PLA Navy antipiracy deployments in
the Indian Ocean have included the Type-71 class amphibious
ship, suggesting interest in a greater PLA Navy littoral presence
beyond the first island chain. 165
Regardless of Beijing’s ultimate intention, many countries in the
region, including India, view any expansion in PLA expeditionary
capabilities as a security concern. Dr. Mastro suggests:
In terms of regional stability, while the Chinese leadership
may only plan on building expeditionary forces to address
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