ANNUAL REPORT

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with USCC
219
for example, 52 percent of China’s crude oil imports by volume
came from the Middle East. 228 Moreover, China could deploy equipment
to Djibouti to collect intelligence on U.S. and friendly forces
in the region. 229 Djibouti hosts U.S. Navy Camp Lemonnier—a critical
hub for U.S. counterterrorism operations in Africa and the
Middle East—as well as Japanese and French military facilities. 230
Gulf of Aden Antipiracy Deployments
In August 2016, China launched its 24th PLA Navy antipiracy
deployment to the Gulf of Aden. 231 These operations have significant
implications for China’s force projection capabilities. According
to DOD, ‘‘The expansion of [Chinese] naval operations beyond China’s
immediate region will facilitate non-war uses of military force
and provide China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets
across the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Improving ‘blue
water’ capabilities will extend China’s maritime security buffer to
protect China’s near and far seas interests more effectively.’’ 232
PLA Navy ships on antipiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden
have also conducted several other security operations in the region,
such as a March 2015 non-combatant evacuation operation in
Yemen 233 and an escort operation for ships transporting chemical
weapons out of Syria for destruction in 2013–2014. 234 Though piracy
in the Gulf of Aden has declined significantly in recent years
due to the success of international piracy efforts, there is no indication
that the PLA Navy will conclude operations there. David
Brewster, senior research fellow at Australian National University’s
National Security College, testified to the Commission that
‘‘Beijing is now using its antipiracy deployment[s] as justification
for expanding its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and making
it more permanent.’’ 235
UN Peacekeeping Operations
In September 2015, President Xi announced China will establish
a ten-year, $1 billion ‘‘China-UN peace and development fund’’ to
support UN activities—to include peacekeeping operations and sustainable
development programs—and commit 8,000 personnel * to
build a UN ‘‘peacekeeping standby force.’’ † 236 China currently has
roughly 2,600 personnel active in UN peacekeeping operations. 237
China’s peacekeeping activities reflect its apparent desire to generate
international goodwill and soft power by demonstrating that
it is a responsible stakeholder in international affairs. 238 These deployments
also support China’s goal to safeguard its overseas economic
interests and expatriate citizens. 239 Moreover, conducting
peacekeeping operations around the world could provide Chinese
personnel with valuable logistics, mobility, and operational experience.
240 In the most notable case of Chinese peacekeeping operations,
in December 2015 China deployed 1,031 personnel on a UN
* ‘‘Personnel’’ here refers to police, military experts, and troops.
† Although authoritative sources have not outlined the mission or role of China’s proposed
peacekeeping standby force, it could resemble the former Denmark-led Standby High-Readiness
Brigade, an international force of thousands of soldiers that from 1997 to 2009 was available
to the UN as a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘‘Peacekeeping Contributor
Profile: Denmark,’’ Providing for Peacekeeping, June 2016; UN, SHIRBRIG: Ready to
Deploy, 2007.
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