ANNUAL REPORT

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mission’s hearing on Chinese intelligence services and espionage
threats to the United States, David Major, the founder and president
of CI Centre, presented a list with the names of 56 individuals
who were arrested or indicted in Taiwan due to their alleged involvement
in Chinese espionage plots over the past 14 years. According
to Mr. Major, these were plots to ‘‘accrue the most significant
technology and intelligence from [Taiwan’s] military and all
three intelligence services. Much of this technology was developed
by the U.S. defense community in the United States and sold to
Taiwan. Justifiable concerns about the security of U.S. defense systems
sold to Taiwan is a byproduct of this espionage activity.’’ 194
The increased travel between Taiwan and China that resulted
from the warming of cross-Strait ties under the Ma Administration
increased Taiwan’s vulnerability to espionage by expanding China’s
opportunities for intelligence operations against Taiwan targets in
both Taiwan and China. With its loosening of regulations on Chinese
tourists, Taiwan has allowed individuals to travel independently
without a tour group. Among other espionage risks, this development
has made ensuring the security of Taiwan defense installations
more difficult. Taiwan’s Liberty Times reported that in
October 2015 many Chinese independent travelers were riding
electric scooters and bicycles taking pictures of the Jioupeng Military
Base, where Taiwan tests missiles. 195
In the face of the Chinese espionage threat, the Taiwan military
has implemented measures to impede Chinese intelligence activities.
Peter Mattis, China fellow at the Jamestown Foundation,
writes that ‘‘Taiwan has made several substantial efforts to improve
security—including trip reporting and routine polygraphs for
personnel with sensitive access as well as boosting its counterintelligence
staff—and serious offenders can, but not always, receive
heavy prison sentences.’’ 196
William Stanton, former director of the American Institute in
Taiwan and current director of Taiwan’s National Tsinghua University’s
Center for Asia Policy, said in 2013 that cases of Chinese
espionage against Taiwan ‘‘have been harmful not only because of
the potential loss of unknown quantities of classified information,
but also because their success and frequency serves to undermine
U.S. confidence in security cooperation with Taiwan.’’ 197 However,
Mr. Major testified to the Commission that ‘‘if the USA begins to
slowdown or stop the transfer of needed technology and information
with Taiwan for fear of espionage loss then the PRC wins and
Taiwan is doomed.’’ 198 He noted that ‘‘during the period 2001 to
2016 154 individuals arrested in the USA were involved in providing
sensitive information and/or technology to entities in China.
Thus PRC ‘espionage’ is a problem and reality for both [Taiwan],
the USA and the world as a whole.’’ 199
Beyond Chinese espionage, Taiwan faces the challenge of Chinese
political warfare. A scholar told the Commission that China
conducts influence operations against Taiwan through academic institutions,
cultural groups, and artistic organizations. 200 Chinese
political warfare not only seeks to affect views within Taiwan but
also views of Taiwan held by people in other countries. For example,
Mr. Cole wrote that some of the ways that China conducts political
warfare against Taiwan are through PLA ‘‘officers at inter-
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