ANNUAL REPORT

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they are part of the same country and so satisfy Beijing.’’ 28 These
statements do not seem to have satisfied Beijing, however.
Beijing’s Approach to President Tsai
Beijing’s approach to President Tsai has been a combination of
statements of insistence on the 1992 Consensus and opposition to
independence for Taiwan, warnings and other measures meant to
put pressure on her administration, and some demonstrations of
nuance and potential flexibility. During a press conference at the
end of January 2016, in response to a question about cross-Strait
relations, a spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) *
said, ‘‘For over 20 years, the history of the development of cross-
Strait relations has already thoroughly proven that by insisting on
the common political framework of the ‘1992 Consensus’ and opposition
to ‘Taiwan independence,’ the prospects for cross-Strait relations
are bright. If this does not happen, the boat of peaceful development
of cross-Strait relations will encounter terrifying waves and
could even capsize completely.’’ 29 The spokesperson made a similar
statement in his response to another question later in the press
conference, and in several other responses to questions he gave implicit
warnings about what might happen if the Tsai Administration
did not accept Beijing’s cross-Strait framework. 30
Despite these hardline statements, Beijing later demonstrated
some nuance and potential flexibility in the remarks of Minister of
Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. In February, after delivering a speech in
Washington, DC, Minister Wang responded to a question about the
impact of the election on ties between China and Taiwan first by
striking a calm tone about President Tsai’s election, saying it was
‘‘just a change of government in Taiwan. . . . It’s something natural.
It should not come as too big a surprise.’’ 31 Then, in the most noteworthy
part of his response, he said that he hopes and expects
President Tsai would ‘‘indicate that she wants to pursue the peaceful
development of cross-straits relations, and that she will accept
the provision in Taiwan’s own constitution that the mainland and
Taiwan belong to one, the same China.’’ 32 Minister Wang then
added a veiled warning,† but his statement about Taiwan’s constitution—although
not identical to President Tsai’s statement—
echoed her pledge to conduct cross-Strait relations according to the
‘‘existing [Taiwan] constitutional order.’’ Mr. Cole wrote, ‘‘Although
we should not read too much into the foreign minister’s comments
. . . it nevertheless hints at the possibility of a more flexible, and
perhaps more pragmatic, approach to Taiwan.’’ 33
During March meetings in China with a delegation of U.S. analysts
organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Chinese interlocutors articulated several areas where Beijing
claimed to demonstrate goodwill and flexibility. Bonnie S. Glaser,
senior advisor for Asia and director of the China Power Project at
* The Taiwan Affairs Office is an agency within China’s State Council that is responsible for
overseeing China’s cross-Strait policies.
† Minister Wang said that people in Taiwan will not accept a violation of Taiwan’s constitution,
because ‘‘they want to see the continued peaceful development of cross-straits relations.
They want to see more mainland visitors. They want to pursue more business ties with the
mainland. And they want to live in a climate of peace and tranquility. The next government
in Taiwan must think about these issues in a serious way.’’ Wang Yi, ‘‘Statesman’s Forum:
Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, PRC’’ (Washington, DC, February 25, 2016).
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