ANNUAL REPORT

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of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar Port in Pakistan.
(For more on China’s port infrastructure investments in South
Asia, see Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and South Asia.’’)
Nonmilitary assets could also contribute to China’s logistics capabilities
in expeditionary operations. For example, the PLA Navy
has relied on Chinese state-owned shipping companies to resupply
antipiracy task forces in the Gulf of Aden. According to Chinese security
experts Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange, China
Ocean Shipping (Group) Company, or COSCO, has used its extensive
network of regional contacts to facilitate relations between the
PLA Navy and local replenishment services suppliers in countries
near the Gulf of Aden.* 89 Rear Admiral McDevitt testified to the
Commission that the PLA Navy has
mastered the logistics of sustaining small task groups on
distant stations. The advantage of a state-owned enterprise
that is in the logistics services business worldwide ([such
as] COSCO) means that China enjoys a built-in shorebased
support structure at virtually all the major ports
along the Pacific and Indian Oceans. When combined with
its modern multi-product replenishment ships that have developed
significant skill in at sea support, this has become
a successful approach to logistic sustainment halfway
around the world from Chinese homeports. 90
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Facilitating Command
and Control
The PLA will continue improving intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for supporting operational troops.
Deployed PLA commanders will require a significant amount of
ISR to support their missions, and space-based sensors and aircraft
will play a vital role in improving commanders’ operational situational
awareness. 91 For instance, the PLA has increased its ISR
coverage in the Asia Pacific with shore-based unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) capable of long-duration reconnaissance operations. 92
In addition to improving shore- and space-based sensors, surface
ships—including intelligence-gathering ships—and aircraft directly
supporting an operation would likely require their own ISR capability.
The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence assesses the PLA Navy
‘‘will probably emerge as one of China’s most prolific UAV users,†
employing UAVs to supplement manned ISR aircraft as . . . they
are ideally suited for this mission . . . [due to] their long loiter time,
* According to Dr. Erickson and Mr. Strange, ‘‘[A] COSCO subsidiary, COSCO West Africa,
Ltd., has become the PLA [Navy’s] largest partner in procuring supplies for escort ships. . . . According
to COSCO’s website, at the close of fiscal year 2011 the company operated a fleet of
157 vessels, which were active at 159 ports in 48 countries.’’ Andrew S. Erickson and Austin
Strange, ‘‘Learning by Doing: PLAN Operational Innovations in the Gulf of Aden,’’ Jamestown
Foundation, October 24, 2013.
† The PLA Navy has operated UAVs from ships since at least June 2011, when a P-3C maritime
surveillance aircraft operated by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force detected a small
UAV operating above a PLA Navy frigate conducting training in the East China Sea. In addition
to shipborne UAVs, China is developing long-range high-endurance UAVs such as the ‘‘Sacred
Eagle’’ for early warning, targeting, and electronic warfare missions, as well as for satellite communications.
Both ship- and land-based UAVs will likely be used in future overseas operations.
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2016, April 26, 2016, 62; James C. Bussert, ‘‘Chinese
Navy Employs UAV Assets,’’ SIGNAL Magazine, April 2012.
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