ANNUAL REPORT

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Figure 7: JL–2 Missile Range Compared to other Chinese Ballistic Missiles
Note: The ring labeled ‘‘5’’ represents the range of the JL–2. DOD uses a mix of both Chinese
and NATO designators in the above graphic. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,
April 7, 2015, 88.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, April 7, 2015, 88.
DOD currently assesses that China will conduct its first SSBN
nuclear deterrence patrol before the end of 2016, a timeline that
has been revised twice (DOD previously estimated the patrol would
occur in 2014, then in 2015). 187 It will not necessarily be clear
when China begins its first nuclear deterrence patrol: though some
of the preparations for a patrol (such as the submarine’s movement
into an underground tunnel complex prior to deployment) may be
observable, it will not be apparent whether a nuclear warhead is
mated to the missile, or when missiles are loaded prior to deployment.*
For this reason, any JIN SSBN deployment may require
senior U.S. defense officials to assume that China is conducting a
deterrence patrol (i.e., a patrol in which an SSBN is armed with
a nuclear warhead).† DOD assesses a fifth JIN-class SSBN will
enter the PLA Navy’s order of battle by 2020, which would provide
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* Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American
Scientists, notes there is a ‘‘covered railway . . . connect[ing] a high-bay building with possible
access into the mountain at the eastern part of the [Longpo naval] base [on Hainan Island]
with one of the land-based tunnels to the underground submarine cave. . . . The covered railway
. . . seems intended to keep movement of something between the two mountains out of sight from
spying satellites. . . . The purpose of the facilities and rail is unknown but might . . . be intended
for movement of SLBMs or other weapons between storage inside the mountain to the submarine
cave for arming of SSBNs.’’ Hans M. Kristensen, ‘‘China SSBN Fleet Getting Ready—
But for What?’’ Federation of American Scientists, April 25, 2014.
† Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated in October 2015 that
when a JIN SSBN goes to sea he must assume it is conducting a deterrence patrol based on
the submarine’s ‘‘operational capability.’’ Cecil Haney, ‘‘Transcript: Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander
STRATCOM, Defense Writers Group,’’ Defense Writers Group, October 22, 2015, 16.
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