ANNUAL REPORT

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CHAPTER 4
CHINA AND THE U.S.
REBALANCE TO ASIA
Introduction
President Barack Obama announced a new emphasis for U.S. foreign
policy in a landmark speech to Australia’s Parliament in 2011,
declaring that ‘‘in the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the United
States of America is all in.’’ 1 Referencing a ‘‘deliberate and strategic
decision’’ that the United States would, as a Pacific nation,
‘‘play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future,’’
the president pledged to increase focus on the region as U.S.
involvement in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq declined, and as the
Asia Pacific rose in importance. 2 He specifically stated the United
States would exercise leadership in promoting regional security,
shared economic prosperity, and good governance. 3 This strategy of
heightened emphasis and leadership came to be termed the ‘‘Rebalance
to Asia.’’
Since its inception, the Rebalance strategy has been a defining
feature of U.S. international relations and of U.S.-Asia Pacific and
U.S.-China relations in particular. It is an indispensable part of the
context in which U.S.-China relations must be examined, and is of
particular importance as Congress and a new administration prepare
to consider the future direction of U.S.-Asia Pacific policy beginning
in 2017. This chapter outlines the different regional approaches
of the United States and China since the Rebalance
began, examining both security and economic aspects. In doing so,
it draws on the Commission’s March 2016 hearing on China and
the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, unclassified briefings with U.S. officials,
the Commission’s 2015 and 2016 fact-finding trips to China
and other countries in the region, consultations with experts on regional
politics and U.S. policy, and open source research and analysis.
The U.S. Rebalance to Asia Strategy
Interests and Objectives Driving the Strategy
While the Rebalance strategy marked a fresh emphasis for U.S.
foreign policy, it did not fundamentally change the United States’
stated interests and objectives in the Asia Pacific region, nor did
it promote interests and objectives that substantially differed from
those the United States pursues at the global level. Rather, President
Obama’s statement outlining the interests driving the security
component of the strategy reflected longstanding U.S. principles:
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