ANNUAL REPORT

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previously noted deployments in the Gulf of Aden, intercept training
in the South China Sea, HA/DR operations in Southeast Asia,
and naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. These capabilities,
however, could also be used in combat scenarios with potential implications
for U.S. interests. For example, training for visit, board,
search, and seizure operations * in conjunction with at-sea intercept
training could easily be applied to a blockade operation
against Taiwan and pose a threat to merchant shipping. Increased
sea and airlift capacity would improve the PLA’s capability to conduct
combat insertion of troops during an island landing campaign.
132 And PLA Navy submarines operating in the Indian Ocean
could delay U.S. ships headed for the South China Sea from
transiting through the Indian Ocean. 133
Expeditionary Capabilities and China as a Responsible Stakeholder
Since the 2005 address given by Robert Zoellick, then deputy secretary
of State, to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
calling for China to become a ‘‘responsible stakeholder,’’ the West
had hoped China would play a larger role in maintaining the global
order. 134 China has indicated an interest in working to solve pressing
global problems and cooperating with the United States, to
some extent, to address common threats such as climate change,
piracy, terrorism, and natural disasters. 135 Mr. Heath notes that
‘‘the logic underpinning the argument for China to become a ‘responsible
stakeholder’ . . . assumes that if Beijing contributed more
to combating commonly shared threats, such as nuclear proliferation,
North Korean provocations, terrorism in the Middle East, and
climate change, the world would benefit—and China and the
United States would enjoy healthier, more cooperative relations.’’
136 China’s development of an expeditionary capability could
facilitate cooperation, particularly in the areas of HA/DR and
antipiracy operations. The United States and its allies in Asia face
a conundrum, however: the same expeditionary capabilities that
would enable China to embrace the role of ‘‘responsible stakeholder’’
and contribute to regional security could enable the PLA to
pose a military threat and spur greater military competition. 137
This reality will likely be a great concern to U.S. allies in Asia and
will require the United States to reassure allies that the United
States will remain present in the region. 138
While China’s development of an expeditionary capability could
make China a useful partner for cooperation on nontraditional security
issues in the region, the United States will need to engage
both Beijing and U.S. allies concerning how this emerging capability
could be employed to improve regional security. 139 Gabe Collins,
a private researcher focused on Chinese security issues, suggests
‘‘any engagement [between the U.S. and Chinese militaries]
needs to incorporate discussions to assess how China intends to use
its growing power projection abilities and also explore ways to de-
* The PLA Navy during predeployment training for Gulf of Aden antipiracy operations conducts
simulations of rescue operations and participates in live fire exercises; the special operations
units take part in training involving rappelling off of shipborne helicopters and visit,
board, search, and seizure techniques. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities,
written testimony of Christopher D. Yung, January 21, 2016.
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