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Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son ... - Historia Antigua

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84 PHILIP AND ALEXANDER AT WAR<br />

men (Xen. Anab. 5.2.14–15), <strong>the</strong> hoplites captured <strong>the</strong> ramparts <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> palisades (Xen. Anab. 5.2.15). 32<br />

Markle maintains that Macedonian forces were typically crosstrained<br />

to fight with both hoplite armament <strong>and</strong> with sarisai <strong>and</strong><br />

peltai. 33 I would argue that this sort of broad training was at fi rst found<br />

only in <strong>the</strong> hypaspist corps. Initially, <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> weaponry would<br />

have been prohibitive. In all likelihood, <strong>Philip</strong> adopted <strong>the</strong> sarisa, in<br />

part, because this form of warfare was inexpensive. Also, training in<br />

both weapon panoplies would have required more time than was typically<br />

available to <strong>the</strong> nonprofessional soldier. This would be especially<br />

true with regard to sarisa training.<br />

Later, in Asia, as <strong>the</strong> army became increasingly professional with<br />

each passing year, cross training became more common. Over time<br />

Alex<strong>and</strong>er switched more of his forces from <strong>the</strong> ranks of <strong>the</strong> sarisa<br />

bearers into that of hoplites. This was made necessary by Alex<strong>and</strong>er’s<br />

dismissal of his League forces, amounting to several thous<strong>and</strong> hoplites<br />

(Arr. Anab. 3.19.6; cf. Diod. 17.17.3); by his need for speed; <strong>and</strong><br />

by <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong> Persian gr<strong>and</strong> army after Gaugamela. Diodorus<br />

(17.65.4) speaks of Alex<strong>and</strong>er making improvements in <strong>the</strong> army after<br />

this third victory. The taxeis of Attalus, Amyntas, <strong>and</strong> Polyperchon,<br />

now appear on expeditions requiring mobility <strong>and</strong> fl exibility (Arr.<br />

Anab. 4.25.1, 5; 3.18.5).<br />

After Alex<strong>and</strong>er’s death, when war was waged by <strong>the</strong> armies of his<br />

Successors, <strong>the</strong> trend reversed itself with increasing use of sarisa<br />

bearers. Polybius describes <strong>the</strong> two opposing phalanxes at Sellasia in<br />

222 B.C. (2.69.7) <strong>and</strong> again at Mantinea in 207 B.C. (11.15.6, 16.1) as<br />

armed with pikes, with no clear evidence of <strong>the</strong> presence of hoplites.<br />

The lessons of <strong>Philip</strong> <strong>and</strong> Alex<strong>and</strong>er regarding <strong>the</strong> advantage of <strong>the</strong><br />

coordination of differently armed units were lost. Nowhere is this<br />

more apparent than in <strong>the</strong> decline in <strong>the</strong> importance of cavalry. At<br />

Sellasia, <strong>the</strong> Macedonian army consisted of ten thous<strong>and</strong> pikemen,<br />

three thous<strong>and</strong> peltasts, <strong>and</strong> three hundred cavalry (Polyb. 2.65.2).<br />

The proportion of infantry to cavalry had changed from approximately<br />

6:1 in <strong>the</strong> time of Alex<strong>and</strong>er to 25:1. 34<br />

Initially only one of Alex<strong>and</strong>er’s brigades was specifi cally designated<br />

as as<strong>the</strong>teroi <strong>the</strong> one led by Coenus. The fi rst reference to<br />

this brigade occurs during <strong>the</strong> siege of Tyre (Arr. Anab. 2.23.2). 35<br />

Arrian states, “One of <strong>the</strong> ships was manned by <strong>the</strong> hypaspists, . . .<br />

<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r by Coenus’s brigade, <strong>the</strong> so-called as<strong>the</strong>tairoi.” 36 From <strong>the</strong><br />

ships <strong>the</strong>se forces exited by gangplank <strong>and</strong> launched an attack by<br />

climbing through a breach in <strong>the</strong> wall (Arr. Anab. 2.23.2,4). It is<br />

unlikely that <strong>the</strong>se troops were armed with pikes. Moreover, Coenus’s<br />

brigade is often found in circumstances requiring great mobility

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