Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son ... - Historia Antigua

100 PHILIP AND ALEXANDER AT WAR
The Kings and the Phalanx: Defeat
and Recovery
It is unlikely that the new formation was dramatically effective. The
ructions in the royal house continued, with Ptolemy struggling against
yet another Argead usurper and facing humiliation at the hands of the
dominant power. Finally disaster struck. Perdiccas, the younger son
of Amyntas, had killed Ptolemy and taken over the Macedonian kingdom.
By this time the vultures were gathering and Macedon was
faced with invasion from the north. Perdiccas fought a major battle
against the Illyrian king Bardylis and lost four thousand men. 48 The
army had not performed with distinction, and for a time it looked as
though Macedon would be dismembered, as there were a series of
challenges to the royal authority, invasions from Paeonia, two more
pretenders backed by Athens and Olynthus, and worst of all, the Illyrians
were planning a resumption of hostilities. In the face of these
threats Philip, the successor to the Argead throne, could only play for
time and put his army through an arduous training routine. According
to Diodorus (16.3.1–2) he concentrated on maneuvers under arms,
and above all, imitated the close formation πυκνότης described by
Homer. 49 Diodorus actually states that he was the fi rst to compact the
Macedonian phalanx ( πρῶτος συνεστήσατο τὴν M ακεδονικὴν
φάλαγγα ). This is something different from the original formation of
the phalanx, when the Foot Companions were established under Alexander
II. Philip focused on the συνασπισμός the tightest concentration
of the phalanx infantry. The battle line would remain ten deep,
but it was literally packed together with shields overlapping. Maneuvering
under such conditions required enormous skill. The great sarisai
needed to be handled with absolute precision if they were not to
collide and throw the whole line into confusion. It is hardly surprising
that Philip trained his men for a lengthy period before resuming
hostilities against the Illyrians.
Around 358, Philip settled accounts with Bardylis. He took the
offensive, demanding that the Illyrians withdraw from Macedonian
territory, and rejected Bardylis’ offer of an armistice. A decisive battle
ensued, and in its course the phalanx distinguished itself. 50 The Illyrians
had adopted a square formation in an attempt to neutralize the
superb Macedonian cavalry. Their intention was to counter any cavalry
attack by the Macedonians from any direction. The tactic proved
a failure. If Frontinus may be believed, the front of the Illyrian square
consisted of picked men, and their formation was vulnerable on the
fl anks where the weaker troops were stationed. In reply, Philip
deployed his forces in a strategy that foreshadowed Gaugamela. His