Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son ... - Historia Antigua

HIERONYMUS OF CARDIA 137
command from fellow generals, especially Peucestas. The following
incident took place after Eumenes’ victory in the competition with
this satrap over who would be the supreme commander. We are told
that Eumenes and the commander of the Macedonian elite unit of the
Silver Shields, Antigenes, planned to stop Antigonus’ advance at the
Pasitigris River in Iran, and therefore asked Peucestas to draft and
bring there ten thousand Persian archers. At fi rst Peucestas ignored
their request because he felt wronged in not having been awarded the
supreme command himself. But then he realized that if Antigonus
won he would lose both his satrapy and his life. Agonizing about his
own situation, and thinking that he would probably get the command
if he had a large number of troops, he brought the requested
ten thousand men. 5
This is hardly the only time in which Peucestas is portrayed negatively
in the sources, thanks most probably to Hieronymus, Eumenes’
friend. 6 In the case of the plan to meet Antigonus on the river, however,
this bias puts Peucestas’ signifi cant contribution to the coalition’s
war efforts in the worst possible light. If we look at what the
satrap actually did, as opposed to his purported motives and thought
process, to which Hieronymus could have hardly been privy, we see
that Peucestas honored in full Eumenes’ request for troops. Rather
than showing an ambition for supreme command, he obeyed the instructions
he was given and helped Eumenes and Antigenes. Moreover,
what is described here as a period of delay and hesitation on his
part was probably the time needed for the mobilization of such a large
force. The source also never mentions that Peucestas could easily
have eliminated his alleged fear of Antigonus by changing to his side,
but that he chose not to. By ascribing to Peucestas ulterior, selfi sh
motives, the source distorted his cooperative conduct and, to judge
by the scholarship that has followed his version, quite successfully. 7
Akin to attributing unworthy and selfi sh motives to individuals is
Hieronymus’ search for a hidden agenda, an offense that he often attributes
to Antigonus. 8 A man’s hidden agenda, however, did not
always refl ect negatively on him, and especially not when he was
favored by the source. Even Alexander’s ulterior motives for the Exile
Decree did not make him appear villainous. In Hieronymus, it seems,
a hidden agenda was deplorable when it targeted other generals, but
not when directed against the troops, who, it should be said, very
rarely had hidden agendas of their own. Two stories involving trickeries
may illustrate the point.
Following Eumenes’ victory over Craterus in 321 or 320 (depending
on the so-called “high” or “low” chronology), Eumenes surrounded
Craterus’ defeated Macedonians and got from them a pledge