Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son ... - Historia Antigua

138 AFTER PHILIP AND ALEXANDER
to join him. At night, however, they fl ed to Antipater, Craterus’ colleague.
Diodorus describes them as faithless men who broke their oath to
Eumenes (Diod. 18.32.2–3). He spared Eumenes, however, a similar
reproach when the Cardian later broke his oath to Antigonus. He also
failed to commend the fl eeing Macedonians for sticking with their original
leader and cause in spite of their defeat, which was rather remarkable
in the time of the Diadochs. It was not just Diodorus’ or his
sources’ pro-Eumenes bias that informed his negative depiction of the
Macedonians. Equally infl uential was the notion that it was fi ne for
generals to deceive the troops but not vice versa. For example, Photius’
summary of Arrian’s history of events after Alexander, which most likely
relied on Hieronymus and some additional sources, relates that before
Antipater crossed back to Europe from Asia in the winter of 320/19, his
army mutinied and demanded money. Antipater promised the troops
that he would pay them in three days at Abydus, which allowed him to
get there in peace, but then he sneaked away under the cover of night to
Thrace. The empty-handed troops followed him the day after. Clearly, it
was justifi ed, even admirable, for a general to get out of trouble by a
stratagem, even if it meant cheating the troops out of their wages. 9
The legitimization and deligitimization of actions and agendas
described above was based on a more broadly elitist approach toward
actors and history. According to this view, individual leaders were
the makers of history, with little credit given to their followers. It
regarded the leaders’ concerns and interests as more worthy than
those of their subordinates and sided with the former whenever their
respective interests were in confl ict. It condoned conformity to well
established values of the elite including the competitive pursuit of
good repute, self-control, and such, and held the military elite to
higher standards of conduct than the masses, but also ranked Macedonians
(and Greeks) above Asians, who were portrayed as their inferiors
and their natural victims in war and plunder. This was hardly a
novel approach, because it was anchored in traditional Greek or conquerors’
mentalities, and in the political, social, and economic hierarchies
of the Argead state. In Macedonia, the king and his elite used
the masses to sustain and enhance their positions and policies, and as
much as kings like Philip or Alexander deemed themselves their subjects’
benefactors, they were primarily their exploiters, as some Macedonians
told Alexander in tears or in resentment (Curt. 9.3.1–3; Arr.
7.8.1–10.7). For men like Hieronymus, who made his career rubbing
shoulders with dynasts such as Eumenes, Antigonus, Demetrius
Poliorcetes, and Antigonus Gonatas, privileging the elite’s role and
perspective came naturally. In the following I wish to examine how
Hieronymus’ elitist approach impacted his history.