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FINAL REPORT - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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However, in recent years, the rapid and fast-changing uptake of radio spectrum by new<br />

services (using broadband, hiperLAN, AMSS technologies etc) has caused a shift in<br />

thinking. The ITU no longer accepts the long-term ‘hoarding’ of frequencies; with WRCs<br />

scheduled every four years and a continual cycle of preparation in regional organisations,<br />

the ITU is able to consider new requirements and make the necessary changes to the<br />

Radio Regulations. An example of this is the MLS frequency allocation (5000-5250MHz),<br />

where only the bottom half of the band is actually used by ARNS; pressure is growing for<br />

the unused portion to be reallocated on a primary basis.<br />

Balanced against this is the current tendency to allocate bands to services, without<br />

adequately judging the viability of sharing the allocation. The prime example is UWB,<br />

which impacts several RNSS/ARNS bands with low power interference; the cumulative<br />

effect of this interference may degrade RNSS signals as UWB proliferates.<br />

The scenario involving decommissioning of VORs and NDBs would face resistance from<br />

regulatory authorities – ICAO wish to maintain the allocations roughly 10 years past the<br />

expected operational need. Any decisions taken should take this factor into account.<br />

Public Perception: The short-term commercial considerations, so important in other<br />

areas of frequency management (such as fixed services), do not apply to ARNS.<br />

Although airlines (the eventual customers) operate reasonably short-term individual<br />

policies, when they are considered as a body the requirements on air traffic services<br />

change fairly slowly, particularly when discussing the removal of certain services.<br />

From the public point of view, the availability and reliability of safety-of-life services in<br />

aviation is taken for granted. Any reduction in the functioning of these services would not<br />

be tolerated. As an example of this, the new GNSS solution (Galileo) has been developed<br />

partly to allay fears that European users were relying on a US Military system with signals<br />

that could be degraded if needed by the US Military (e.g. in wartime). Therefore, a<br />

European civil system was designed to give unhindered access and performance.<br />

When looking at decommissioning VORs and NDBs, an interesting point is raised<br />

regarding the redundancy of RNAV – with no point-to-point navigation aids available, the<br />

flight crew would have no back-up ‘first principles’ method if RNAV was incapacitated.<br />

Safety studies are currently on-going to examine this point. If issues are found, it may<br />

mean a reprieve for VORs.<br />

The application of pricing<br />

<strong>Ofcom</strong>, following a recent review of spectrum management, has been tasked with<br />

encouraging greater spectrum efficiency through the use of administrative incentive<br />

pricing (AIP) – prices set by the regulator that should reflect the opportunity cost of<br />

spectrum use (thereby providing effective incentives for efficient use). AIP can influence<br />

both the allocation of spectrum, and the assignment of spectrum rights; however, as<br />

ARNS and RNSS allocation is generally governed by international agreements, it is in the<br />

assigning of rights that AIP has the most leverage.<br />

Balanced against this purely economic viewpoint is the cost of the social use of spectrum<br />

– in short, the ‘opportunity cost’ of having a safety-of-life service of adequate performance<br />

versus losing this safety-of-life service due to poor performance. In airborne navigation,<br />

this ‘opportunity cost’ in most cases outweighs any considerations of pure pricing. Indeed,<br />

in the recent <strong>Ofcom</strong> study on spectrum pricing it was suggested that any services<br />

internationally allocated on an exclusive basis which do not experience in-band<br />

congestion should be exempt from AIP. According to Cave, the effective opportunity cost<br />

to individual users of ARNS is usually zero, due to mandated standards for safety-of-life<br />

services – most often corresponding to a particular equipage on-board the aircraft (with<br />

the notable example of 8.33 kHz vs. 25 kHz channel spacing in the VHF band, discussed<br />

in aeronautical comms below). This applies to VORs, ILS and DME.<br />

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