Part III: Antarctica and Academe - Scott Polar Research Institute

“Appraisal, admittedly influenced by hindsight of the events of 4-17 February
suggested to me that:
1. The incident involving the near arrest of Shackleton occurred on 4 February and
details had been published in the world press before I received the first telegram of
suggestions on 11 February. My only knowledge of the incident was third-hand
while at Halley Bay, by rumour from Bransfield. By the time tel. no.C/527/76 was
received we had finished the South Shetland Islands work and were back on
itinerary. The Governor had promised to let me know if the flight out via Comodoro
on 16 February was inadvisable and Stanley was clearly expecting us. Also the
Governor knew that Biscoe carried cypher books and could have passed information.
The telegrams therefore remained a puzzle. I did not know that an Argentine
destroyer was in the vicinity of Stanley.
2. Instead of the ambiguous tel. no. C/527/76, followed by C/553/76 instructing
me to proceed to Punta Arenas, it would perhaps have been better to send the
following basic information and to have left the decision to me.
a) an account of the Shackleton incident as soon as permissible, an account of
her then whereabouts (Stanley) and information that an Argentine Destroyer was
waiting off Cape Pembroke, FI. Surely no secrecy was necessary because the
details were by then published world-wide.
b) Instructions what not to do, ie: BAS ships not to visit Stanley or Argentina
until further notice; if visiting Punta Arenas to use a western approach;
discontinue Jahn's programme north of 60°S.
3. In that event Biscoe would have gone to Signy and South Georgia to continue
her programme. The 180 tons of fuel available was enough for five weeks normal
work and there was more at South Georgia and Signy. If the situation had not
improved Biscoe could then have sailed from South Georgia to Punta Arenas or
Montevideo, having met with Bransfield for personnel transfers. The programmes
would have suffered less and I would have been more in touch with HQ, the Bases
and Bransfield.
4. against this:
a) no full explanation was possible by mail (but the Governor could
have sent a basic explanation in cypher).
b) I would have had to delay my return to UK by up to five weeks. (However
the option of an exit through Punta Arenas was still open and the situation
was likely to have been resolved before this was necessary - as indeed it was)
5) Malcolm agreed with this asessment. “ [Extract from my diary]
There was a football match against Comapa for 6.30 pm but Malcolm and I had
been invited to dinner by David Cobham for 7.30 pm so I didn't watch it; they won 3-
0. It was a good game apparently and generated much friendship, being followed by
food and wine. We had a pleasant and enjoyable dinner - Centollas in avocados,
pepper-steak and wine, and then sat talking over a brandy until midnight when
Malcolm and I strolled back to the ship.
We sailed at 11.30 am on 18 February. I drafted a number of tels to send off at the
2.30 pm sched. Then I spent an hour or two on deck trying to get photographs of the
lovely Commerson's dolphins, without success. Where the tide rip was strongest
there was a large concentration of seabirds, mainly penguins and cormorants, but
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