Part III: Antarctica and Academe - Scott Polar Research Institute

helicopters could not be used or that a large indemnity would have to be paid.
To ensure that there wasn't a similar confusion at the relief in November, the
Husvik party telexed Cambridge and Myriam Booth, Stanley, with details of number
and weight of equipment boxes. On 11 November Captain Porter (JSMS) had
confirmed helicopter support would be provided. On 23 November RFA Sir
Launcelot arrived at KEP expecting to collect four scientists and their suitcases; they
had no knowledge of 1 ton of equipment and no facilities for offloading it. The
Husvik party and their personal gear were taken on board. On 24 November the
Command Secretary (Ashworth) and O/C Army Air Corps (Gp Capt Curry)
expressed the belief that the breakdown in communications was due to BAS. On 25
November the Husvik equipment was loaded, using a mexefloat from KEP. Curry
refused transfer of McCann and Davis-Hughes to Bird Island (previously agreed).
He indicated that use of the helicopters might be possible if BAS paid (c.£1500/hr)
and lodged a £5 million indemnity. Then on 26 November he said there was no way
that civilians could be flown in Gazelles. (However, it was my understanding that
Curry, Ashworth and their wives were flown around sightseeing). Fortunately for
our two scientists, the yacht Damien II was in the vicinity and Jerome and Sally
Poncet took them to Bird Island, so eventually the story ended happily.
It was abundantly clear to me that BAS had used the communications channels
correctly, but that JSMS had not passed on the information to the Masters of the RFA
vessels concerned. Admiral Leyman couldn't accept this. He claimed that the £5
million indemnity was of long standing. If so, I asked, why had it not been raised
with us on previous occasions, and why were we not told of it at the planning stage?
It seemed fairly clear to me that we couldn't rely on the military to support us and
this wasn't good enough. I went on to see Barry Ashworth (Command Secretary), an
MOD civil servant. He was pleasant enough to me, but made the same points as the
Admiral. (But the cost of passages by ship to SG included an element of insurance).
It seemed strange that they could justify charging us for the passages, without any
intention of putting our people ashore! It also became clear that the RFA vessels
don't have suitable workboats or experienced crew to put people ashore by boat. At
this point Brigadier Coxon, who had obviously been sent along by the Admiral,
joined the discussion. He started out in quite a hard way, but softened as we talked
and eventually we got onto whales and Antarctic biology and conservation!
However, there seemed little prospect of any reasonable guarantee of getting people
ashore other than at Grytviken.
I then saw Captain Bredin, a very pleasant man, the SG Liaison Officer. He was
very sympathetic and understood our position, readily agreeing that we had been let
down. But I didn't think he could do much to help. I also raised with him the
question of the BAS SG inventories, which had dragged on since the War. He agreed
with my suggestion, that to put in a bill for our belongings, was the way to proceed.
The Army would then assume ownership. While there Captain Debbie Porter (JSMS)
came in and she too agreed with the BAS position. So there it stood for the moment.
This took up the whole morning. I had lunch on the Bransfield (Jewkes was going to
the Camp for a few days). After lunch I went ashore again and drove with Myriam
to the RFA Sir Launcelot - moored down the harbour - to see her Master Captain
Yeoman. He was a sensible, practical down-to-earth man. We had tea. He said he
understood the BAS position and sympathized - but he had no helicopter under his
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