Part III: Antarctica and Academe - Scott Polar Research Institute

The first real worry came at 21.00 – “Britain calls for immediate meeting of UN
Security Council” – the next day could be to late for there were reports that the entire
Argentine fleet had set sail and that all army leave had been cancelled. By 01.00 it
was announced that reports from Argentina stated there would be a dawn invasion
of the Falklands. Many of the crew were Falkland Islanders and some could stand it
no longer; they implored Stuart Lawrence (Captain) to change course and head for
the Falklands. Their reasoning was that, if they were invaded, the islanders,
including their friends would believe that they had run away and deserted them in
their hour of need. Most did not believe an invasion was possible and, in any case,
there was really nothing they could do; they went to bed full of foreboding.
During that night when listening to BBC World Service news broadcasts
(Falkland time 23.00 hours, 24-00. and 01.00) it became beyond doubt that an
invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina was imminent. BBC correspondents
reported that Britain had called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security
Council immediately as tomorrow could be too late. The Argentine fleet was
reported at sea including transports and landing craft. All military leave had been
cancelled; paratroops, marines and aircraft were expected to land at dawn.
At 05.50 on Friday 2 April R.R.S. Bransfield was off the north-eastern coast of
Tierra del Fuego heading SSE for the Grahamland Peninsula. At 06.00 Hugh
O’Gorman, the Radio Operator, picked up a report on the Falkland Island
Broadcasting Service (FIBS!) that landing craft were entering Stanley harbour. The
invasion was a fact. Friends and other people with whom only three days before they
had been working and socialising, were now fighting for their lives. People gathered
in a stunned radio room and many spent an anguished day hanging on every word
that came in from Stanley, Grytviken and London. At 06.15 Bransfield altered course
to 090 to clear the Argentine coast and prevent any sighting of the vessel from Staten
Island.
Three hours after fighting commenced Stuart Lawrence finally achieved a
telephone link with myself; I had received an unconfirmed report but until then no
details. I instructed him to continue on a course to Faraday Base. [At 06.15 Bransfield
altered course to 090 to clear the Argentine coast and prevent any sighting of the
vessel from Staten Island.] It was not until two hours after a truce had been called
that the BBC announced the Falklands were being invaded. What was HMS
Endurance up to? Hugh, the Radio Officer, spent the day attempting to make other
connections with me at BAS, Cambridge and to find out what had happened on the
British bases. Bransfield and BAS HQ now seemed to be almost the only link with the
UK. (I tell elsewhere how I passed this information to Whitehall and the Cabinet).
To add to the feeling of unreality those on the ship had only to look out of the
window to be dazzled by brilliant sunshine and the sight of Argentine mountains on
the horizon. Early that morning an Argentine radio station had continually asked
them to identify themselves - without being acknowledged. What would have
218