Part III: Antarctica and Academe - Scott Polar Research Institute

British Territory. There was much speculation among the Fids. I discussed the
situation with Stuart, Hugh O'Gorman and Donald Logan in the afternoon. We
arrived at Punta Arenas at 1.30 pm next day and took the afternoon flight to Santiago
on 25 March. On 26 March I had a meeting at INACH (Chilean Antarctic Institute)
with Pedro Romero (Director), Morchio and José Valencia to discuss some problems
Rothera was experiencing - conflicts over responsibility for air operations flight
control systems. This was resolved satisfactorily and the Chileans seemed keen on
co-operation. However, it was an Air Force matter, not an INACH one; we'd see
what happened. And so I took a flight to London that evening, in the face of the
rapidly deteriorating situation with Argentina. It was to be only a week before they
invaded South Georgia and captured 15 of my people!
On 24 March Ambassador Williams and Colonel Love, Military Attaché, had warned
the MOD and FCO of the risks inherent in a direct confrontation with the Argentine
navy under the current circumstances and the FCO lost its nerve and decided not to
evict the Davidoff party! Captain Barker was instead instructed to go to King
Edward Cove and await further orders. Lord Carrington warned the Cabinet Office
and the MOD of the delicate situation on South Georgia and suggested the initiation
of naval/military contingency planning. He again asked that the Endurance be left on
station. The Endurance arrived in Cumberland East Bay and her Royal Marines took
over from the BAS the task of watching Leith Harbour and the following day the
Bahia Paraiso arrived at Leith Harbour from Southern Thule and illegally landed a
party of marines with six months' stores for the scrap metal work-force. She left three
days later and proceeded to a “loitering” position approximately fifteen miles off the
mouth of the Cumberland Bays. The situation was getting warmer.
From our Embassy in BA Captain Mitchell, Naval Attaché, sent his first detailed
report on 25 March (based mainly upon local newspaper reports) informing London
of the high state of readiness of the Argentine navy. Next day he informed London of
the first sailings of the Argentine navy (ostensibly on anti-submarine exercises) and
the departure for South Georgia of two small frigates. The British Embassy began
shredding its most sensitive military and naval files and the shredding machines in
its Registry continued to operate throughout the next weekend, completing the task
of destroying its naval and military files on 30 March, when they started to destroy
all the other documents.
On Friday 26 March Captain Mitchell sent a long and urgent signal to London
announcing that the Argentine naval bases were now almost empty of ships and that
at least one battalion of marines has been reported embarking with armoured
vehicles. Together with information from other sources, this was strong evidence
that the Argentine navy was unlikely to be deploying merely for anti-submarine
exercises. (It is known that on Monday 29 March the junta confirmed the final details
of Admiral Anaya's plans for the invasion of South Georgia and the Falkland
Islands). The FCO advised the Ambassador to prepare for a worsening in the
situation. John Nott, our Secretary of State for Defence, agreed to leave Endurance on
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