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ECONOMICS UNIQUENESS

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ECONOMIC VALUATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE ■ 93<br />

Th e ability of stated preference methods to identify quasi-market values for<br />

non-market goods has one major down side: the hypothetical character of the<br />

statements made by consumers raises questions about their methodological reliability<br />

in investigating and assessing the willingness to pay of the consumers in<br />

actual cases (Arrow et al. 1993; Hoevenagel 1994; Murphy et al. 2005; Snowball<br />

2008). Several biases in stated preference methods have been identifi ed in the literature<br />

(Kahneman and Knetsch 1992; Snowball 2008). In particular, it has been<br />

observed that the stated willingness to pay oft en diff ers signifi cantly from the<br />

willingness to accept, as paying and receiving are not necessarily symmetric due<br />

to a ceiling caused by income availability (Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991; Morrison<br />

1997a, 1997b).<br />

Over the years, various amendments have been introduced that reduce the risk<br />

of some strategic biases in preference statements. Snowball (2008) also identifi es<br />

various potential problems in the literature with regard to the conjoint analysis<br />

method, as there may be problems related to complexity and choice consistency<br />

as well as to individual valuation and summation. Snowball also mentions in<br />

the context of cultural goods two reasons why a mixed good—with both private<br />

and public goods characteristics—could cause a bias. In the fi rst place, there is<br />

an incentive for users to overstate its non-use value (Th rosby 1984). Secondly,<br />

willingness-to-pay studies may also capture expected economic benefi ts that<br />

do not only refl ect present earnings but also bequest earnings (Seaman 2003).<br />

Nevertheless, it seems plausible that research conducted according to the United<br />

States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recommendations<br />

1 by Arrow et al. (1993) is more valid, more reliable, and reduces the size<br />

of a number of biases (Noonan 2003; Snowball 2008). Benefi ts or value transfers<br />

can be used if estimations in one context can be generalized to indicate values in<br />

other similar contexts. It is thus clear that the validity and reliability of contingent<br />

valuation methods—and stated preference methods in general—are still matters<br />

of debate (Diamond and Hausman 1994), especially in situations in which benefi t<br />

transfers are harder to realize.<br />

Over the years, there have been various applied studies using stated preference<br />

methods for the evaluation of cultural heritage assets. One of the fi rst contingent<br />

valuations of cultural heritage is found in a study to value the Nidaros<br />

Cathedral in Norway (Navrud and Strand 1992). Subsequently, stated preference<br />

techniques for the evaluation of cultural heritage have been applied in numerous<br />

evaluation studies. Noonan (2003) off ers a meta-analysis of this rich literature.<br />

Snowball (2008) provides an update of the contingent valuation literature, in<br />

which the application of conjoint choice experiments in the cultural economics<br />

fi eld is also reviewed. More recent examples include a study by Alberini et al.<br />

(2003) on the value of the cultural and historical dimensions of a square in a city,<br />

done by comparing the actual square with a hypothetical square that is similar

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