ECONOMICS UNIQUENESS

170 ■ THE ECONOMICS OF UNIQUENESS
Th e ECHQ shared risks with landowners and investors and proved the feasibility
of selling or renting commercial space to new businesses willing to establish
themselves in the historic city core. In Valparaiso public and private actors have
operated independently, resulting in most private investment concentrating in
two sectors of the real estate market: second homes for weekend use and spaces
for commercial activities linked to service tourism. Furthermore, private investments
have been concentrated mostly in two sections of the historic city core, the
Cerro Alegre and Concepción neighborhoods, which cover less than one-fourth
of the area included in the World Heritage Site. Th ese contrasting outcomes can
be partly explained by the institutional arrangements used to implement the conservation
process.
Nominating important heritage properties for inclusion on UNESCO’s World
Heritage List is a prerogative of the national authorities—under the condition of
a Member State and signatory of the World Heritage Convention. Th e nomination
process is led by the national heritage agencies and promoted by members of
cultural groups, including ICOMOS. In the best of cases, they seek the opinion of
local groups but rarely of the resident community. In Salvador, the resident community
had negligible involvement in the process. In Quito, organizations of the
civil society were active supporters of the municipality in promoting the nomination,
and in Valparaiso the municipality worked with the national government in
pursuing the inclusion of the historic city core on the World Heritage List, with
sporadic involvement of local stakeholders within the community. In Oaxaca the
nomination was promoted by local organizations of the civil society, but the community
had scarce input in the process.
Th e process of seeking inclusion on the World Heritage List is oft en pursued
with little clarity about the purpose besides a desire for the pride, prestige, and
international attention that listing may bring, and with that the expected positive
impact on tourism. Th is is clearly the case in Salvador, and, predictably, a few
years aft er the nomination local communities still saw little advantages arising
from the listing (Mendes Zancheti and Gabriel 2011).
As discussed in the previous section, institutional arrangements used to
implement the conservation eff ort aff ect its outcomes and sustainability. Th e
dominance of one institution on the process tends to crowd out other interested
parties, hence reducing the essential social support base that could bring
vitality, creativity, innovative approaches to the project concept design, and additional
funds to the project. Th is leaves the sustainability of the conservation process
subject to the vagaries of having a single institution making decisions and
fi nding funding sources. Th is is the case in Salvador, where the culture institute
linked to the government of the state of Bahia (Instituto Cultural da Bahia, ICB)
was charged with the responsibility as the executing agency of the rehabilitation
and conservation of the historic city core.